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This exploration of four case studies develops a theory of how the United States 
Congress can enact forward-looking legislation. The theory is set in the multiple streams 
framework developed by John Kingdon and modified with insights of subsequent 
scholars. A case study of the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection and Consumer Protection Act (P.L 111-203) was employed to test 
the usefulness of the framework. A case study of the Washington DC-based Bipartisan 
Policy Center’s lobbying strategy and insights from the literature of forward-looking 
policymaking were then used to develop ten propositions for a theory. The propositions 
were evaluated by examining the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 
(P.L. 91-604), and the failed 2009-2010 effort to address climate change with legislation 
for capping and trading greenhouse gas emission credits. Six of the ten propositions 
found good support. It is recommended that these six be developed into hypotheses and 
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This study began with the conviction that policymakers in democratic countries 
have a strong bias towards the present concerns of constituents to the detriment of future 
generations. As a person in his 70s, I wonder what type of legacy we are leaving for our 
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improve the policy balance between the needs of the present and the needs of future 
generations. 
I would like to thank my life partner Carolyn for her emotional support and editing 
help during my years with Johns Hopkins. Jonathan Boston, Alan Jacobs, Kathryn 
Wagner Hill, Jacob Straus, and Douglas Harris provided excellent criticism and 





Table of Contents 
Abstract....................................................................................................................................... ii 
Foreword .................................................................................................................................... iii 
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. vi 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................... vii 
Chapter 1 Forward-Looking Policy in Democracies ...................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2 Multiple Streams in the Enactment of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (P.L 111-203)....................................................................................... 5 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework for Policy Change........................................... 6 
Modifications Based On Subsequent Contributions .................................................... 10 
Examining the Modified Framework ........................................................................... 14 
Narrative of the Case ................................................................................................ 15 
2009 1st Quarter ..................................................................................................... 17 
2009 2nd Quarter .................................................................................................... 19 
2009 3rd Quarter..................................................................................................... 20 
2009 4th Quarter ..................................................................................................... 22 
2010 1st Quarter ..................................................................................................... 25 
2010 2nd Quarter .................................................................................................... 26 
Discussion................................................................................................................. 29 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 36 
Chapter 3 The Bipartisan Policy Center: Lobbying for the Future ............................................... 38 
Literature Review ...................................................................................................... 39 
Case Study: Strategies of the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) .................................... 43 
v 
 
Background ............................................................................................................... 45 
Findings .................................................................................................................... 47 
Discussion: Comparing BPC’s Strategies on a Current and Long-term Issues............ 51 
Conclusion and Next Steps ....................................................................................... 54 
Chapter 4 A Tale of Two Bills .................................................................................................... 56 
The Work of Forward-Looking Problem Brokers......................................................... 57 
The Work of Forward-Looking Policy Entrepreneurs .................................................. 59 
The Work of Forward-Looking Political Entrepreneurs ............................................... 61 
Propositions .............................................................................................................. 62 
Findings: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (91-604) ....................................... 63 
Problem Brokers .................................................................................................... 64 
Policy Entrepreneurs .............................................................................................. 66 
Political Entrepreneurs ........................................................................................... 68 
Findings: Cap and Trade Legislation 2009-2010 ........................................................ 71 
Problem Brokers .................................................................................................... 73 
Policy Entrepreneurs .............................................................................................. 74 
Political Entrepreneurs ........................................................................................... 77 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 82 
Chapter 5 One Investigation Ends, Others Begin ....................................................................... 86 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 98 





List of Tables 
 
Table 1 Comparison of Communication  Efforts……………………………………..……48 
Table 2 Infrastructure Communication and Lobbying Efforts - November 1, 2014 – 
October 31, 2019……………………………………………………………………………...48 







List of Figures 
Figure 1 Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework……………………………………………..9 
Figure 2 Modified Multiple Streams Framework……………………………………………..13 




Chapter 1 Forward-Looking Policy in Democracies 
In 2019, the Pew Research Center asked a representative panel of U.S. citizens what 
issues should be top, important, or low priorities, “in order for the federal government to improve 
the quality of life for future generations.”  Strong majorities raised issues that Congress has not 
been able to address as top priorities: climate change, immigration reform, Social Security 
viability, healthcare access and affordability, technology-driven unemployment, the growth of 
government debt, energy security, and income inequality.1 Why does Congress find it difficult to 
face long-term and emerging problems? Jonathan Boston summarizes general reasons why 
democratic governments find it difficult to enact forward-looking policies including, “…incomplete 
information, disputed evidence, deep uncertainty, scarce resources, vigorous distributional 
conflicts, competing moral imperatives, impatient voters, powerful and well-organized interests, 
multiple veto points, and many unwelcome surprises.”2  
Other  scholars have added a number of ideas about the difficulty of enacting forward-
looking policies. Creating policies to address emerging problems often requires careful thinking 
about the future, but Alan Jacobs argues that projecting the effects of a policy decades into the 
future involves the interaction of complex causal chains that are often beyond our intellectual 
capabilities.3 Some issues are not addressed because they are “slow problems” that develop 
gradually and never activate public pressure.4 Some scholars have blamed short electoral 
cycles.5 Others argue long-term issues are not addressed because the young, who would benefit 
most by forward-looking decisions, are practically excluded from policymaking.6 Sometimes, the 
potential tradeoffs are difficult to evaluate because they are between different measures of value, 
                                                   
1 Kim Parker, Rich Morin, and Juliana Horowitz, "Looking to the Future, Public Sees an America in Decline on Many 
Fronts," (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2019). 
2 Jonathan Boston, Governing for the Future: Designing Democratic Institutions for a Better Tomorrow (Bingley, UK: 
Emerald Group Publishing, 2017), xxiii. 
3 Alan M. Jacobs, Governing for the Long Term: Democracy and the Politics of Investment (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
4 Robert L. Olson, "Missing the Slow Train: How Gradual Change Undermines Public Policy & Collective Action," 
(Washington DC: Wilson Center, 2016). 
5 Anthony King, Running Scared: Why America’s Politicians Campaign Too Much and Govern Too Little (New York: The 
Free Press, 1997). 
6 Ronald Brownstein, "The Young and the Powerless," National Journal  (2013). 
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for instance short-term financial costs for long-term cleaner air.7 Legislating for the future has 
even been called politically illogical because the majority party must often impose short-term 
costs on voters and organized interests while another political party may be in control and claim 
credit when the future benefits arrive.8 
While addressing long-term issues is difficult for democratic governments, it is not 
hopeless. Boston documents 27 major laws with long-term implications passed in his native New 
Zeeland since 1989.9 Jacobs examined ten historical cases of four nations making decisions 
about pension program reforms and found many in which governments showed foresight, 
designing programs that imposed near-term costs to assure the long-term stability of benefits.10 If 
forward-looking policies are occasionally enacted under democratic governments despite the 
obstacles, how does it happen? 
For this study, a forward-looking policy is defined as one that addresses a long-term 
legacy–or emerging–problem with a solution flexible enough to meet a range of possible future 
developments, and a policy outcome that relies on long-term goals or future scenarios.11 Long-
term is defined as a policy designed to affect social conditions 20 or more years in the future, 
implying that policymakers are thinking beyond several congressional and presidential terms to 
improve the lives of citizens too young to make their voices heard. 
The focus of this study is on Congress because it is the premier policy-making body in 
the United States, accounting for 64% of significant domestic policy enactments at the federal 
level between 1945 and 2004 according to one study.12 Of course, the executive and judicial 
branches also create federal policy. A comprehensive study would include all three branches, but 
that would make this study unmanageable. Congress’s control of the appropriations process for 
                                                   
7 Boston. 
8 Sarah A. Binder, "Can Congress Legislate for the Future?," John Brademas Center for the Study of Congress, 
https://wagner.nyu.edu/files/admissions/Binder.pdf. 
9 Boston, 34-35. 
10 Jacobs. 
11 W. D. Pot et al., "What Makes Long-Term Investment Decisions Forward Looking: A Framework Applied to the Case of 
Amsterdam's New Sea Lock," Technological Forecasting and Social Change 132 (2018). 
12 Matt Grossmann, Artists of the Possible: Governing Networks and American Policy Change since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 53. 
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implementation also makes it a central player, especially as many policy efforts became 
gridlocked beginning in the 1990s.13  
To explore this topic, a three part study was undertaken. Chapter 2 describes a 
framework that is later used to supply the categories for a forward-looking theory of policy 
development. For reasons explained in the chapter, John Kingdon’s multiple streams framework 
was selected and then modified with contributions from later policy scholars. In contrast to 
Kingdon’s focus on the single role of policy entrepreneur in coupling information streams, the 
modified framework provides the differentiated roles of problem brokers who frame social 
conditions as public problems, policy entrepreneurs who develop and promote policy solutions to 
address the problems, and political entrepreneurs who work through governing networks to 
modify and combine policies in ways that will gain majority support.  
In part, the multiple stream framework was chosen because it is flexible enough to 
accommodate foresight efforts as a source for the stream of problems that policymakers deal 
with. Foresight efforts are converted by policy actors into theories of how future conditions will 
develop and those theories become a source of policy ideas. The chapter then relates a case 
study about the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank; P.L 111-203) to assess the usefulness of the framework. 
Chapter 3 begins development of a theory of forward-looking policy enactment by 
studying lobbying strategies of the Washington, DC-based Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC). This 
organization simultaneously advocates for increased spending by the federal government on 
infrastructure and for research and development spending to change the future mix of energy 
sources in the U.S. The question on their work was how their lobbying and education strategies 
changed when dealing with the current, well-understood issue of inadequate infrastructure 
spending compared to their strategies when advocating a forward-looking policy of changing the 
nation’s energy mix.  
                                                   
13 Christopher McGrory Klyza and David J. Sousa, American Environmental Policy, 1990-2006: Beyond Gridlock 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2008). 
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 Chapter 4 combines insights from the Dodd-Frank and BPC cases with arguments from 
the literature of forward-looking policymaking, and the modified multiple streams framework to 
develop propositions about necessary conditions to enact forward-looking policy in Congress. 
The propositions are then examined in the context of the successful enactment of a 
groundbreaking environmental law, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (CAA70; P.L. 91-
604), and a major failed effort to address climate change by enacting a “cap and trade” system for 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2009-2010 (Cap and Trade). 
The study focused on these cases because environmental policy is characterized by 
complexity, scientific uncertainty, dynamism, precautionary work, and controversy–factors that 
stress the institutional capacity of Congress.14 Second, each meets the definition of a forward-
looking policy. CAA70 addressed a long-term legacy issue of poor air quality that had been 
developing for decades. The Cap and Trade effort addressed the emerging issue of climate 
change, which had been developing unnoticed by most Americans for decades, but was 
projected to cause major problems in the future. Both the enacted CAA70 and the proposed Cap 
and Trade had robust regulatory systems to meet a range of possible future developments, and 
justifications that relied on long-term health and welfare goals. Each was designed to affect social 
conditions more than 20 years into the future. 
Grossmann found striking differences in how policy is enacted in different policy domains 
by the U.S. Government. By focusing on a particular policy domain, these cases are not 
necessarily representative of Congress’ efforts to pass forward-looking laws in other domains. 
However, they provide an initial test of ideas about the enactment of forward-looking policy that 
future studies can test in other national and policy contexts. 
  
                                                   
14 Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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Chapter 2 Multiple Streams in the Enactment of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (P.L 111-203) 
To begin this exploration, a search was begun for a theoretical framework that could 
serve as a foundation to answer the question of how Congress can enact forward-looking 
policies. These are policies that address problems with solutions flexible enough to meet a range 
of conditions for a minimum of 20 years, and which meet policy objectives that rely on long-term 
goals or future scenarios. In addressing the question, it is assumed that individual and 
organizational actors are dealing with the current institutional context of Congress. Given this 
context, an examination of recent congressional action implies that it takes tremendous effort for 
actors inside and outside of Congress to pass any legislation, much less a forward-looking policy 
that may impose near-term costs to achieve a long-term goal.15 A useful framework for the study, 
then, would provide concepts about how actors–inside and outside of Congress–can mobilize to 
overcome its institutional inertia. 
In addition to accommodating a diverse set of actors, the fact that these policies are 
focused on long-term goals or future scenarios implies that these goals and scenarios must have 
a way of entering the policy dialogue. Due to the extreme time pressure on Congress to deal with 
thousands of bills in a session, a focus on must-pass bills such as annual budgets, the short time 
cycle of elections, and continuous campaigning,16 it is unlikely that members of Congress will 
bring up long-term issues on their own. Nor will the often overburdened civil servants of the 
executive branch, the constituents with immediate problems, or the corporate lobbyists protecting 
their clients’ current interests. A theoretical framework would need to show a source for forward-
looking policy ideas outside of these usual influencers of congressional action. 
Given these considerations, Kingdon’s multiple streams framework seemed the best fit 
for this study because it emphasizes the agency of individual actors in creating policy and its 
                                                   
15 A review of the productivity of the 116th Congress (2017-2018) on the Congress.gov website revealed that of 14,436 
bills introduced, only 150, or 1%, became law. A very interesting question is how the institutional rules of Congress 




concepts cover many outside sources of policy ideas. It is also well understood—Google Scholar 
shows 24,000 citations to Kingdon’s foundational work, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public 
Policies.17 It also supports a very active research program.18 This study also updates the 
framework with relevant changes scholars have proposed since its first publication in 1984. A 
modified framework is then compared to a narrative about the enactment of the Dodd-Frank to 
evaluate the face validity of its fit with a legislative case.  
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework for Policy Change 
Kingdon’s multiple stream framework (MSF) is called a framework because it is not a 
theory in the sense of having testable hypotheses, but supports theoretical work by providing 
categories for thinking about the policy process.19 Kingdon concluded that policymakers are 
confronted by three separate streams of information. The problem stream contains information 
about social conditions that have been framed as public problems. Information about problems is 
plentiful, but ambiguous, with many competing frames and interpretations being offered. Not only 
is information about problems plentiful and ambiguous, but policymakers must consider it under 
severe time constraints, often without pre-existing policy preferences.20  
A second is called the policy stream.  Kingdon found evidence of policy communities that 
originate policy proposals. These communities are made up of academics, think tanks, civil 
servants, congressional aides, and stakeholders who originate, critique, and modify each other’s 
ideas in a process Kingdon calls softening up. The communities are specialized in particular 
policy domains or styles of polices. They often develop a common outlook about policy solutions 
before there is any great interest from politicians.21 
Finally, the political stream describes the political factors policymakers must navigate 
when enacting policy. These include elections, partisan interests, the national mood, and interest 
                                                   
17 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2011). 
18 Michael D. Jones et al., "A River Runs through It: A Multiple Streams Meta-Review," Policy Studies Journal 44, no. 1 
(2016). 
19 Hank C. Jenkins-Smith et al., "The Advocacy  Coalition Framework: An Overview of the Research Program," in 
Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M Weible (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2018). 
20 Kingdon, 90-115. 
21 Ibid., 116-45. 
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group pressures. National mood captures the idea of how politicians and their staffs read public 
opinion. In large measure, it is policymakers’ perception of what interested publics want Congress 
to do or not do.22 
How does government policy develop in such a context? Kingdon’s study is rich with 
insights, but a simplified framework (Figure 1) developed from this work includes the following 
elements. Policy develops from a coupling of problems that are deemed appropriate for 
government action, with policy ideas, and politics.23 Not all social conditions are viewed as 
problems ready for government action. Social conditions enter the  problem stream when new 
knowledge comes to light, feedback shows existing program failures, social indicators are 
deteriorating, or focusing events take place.  
A growing awareness of social conditions as problems motivates policy experts to either 
develop policy ideas to address them or to apply existing ideas to them. In the policy stream, 
proposals develop from dialogue within communities that focus on particular policy domains. 
Policies are refined within these communities until they meet standards of technical feasibility, 
value acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints.24  
The political stream determines the relative capabilities and constraints on factions within 
decision-making bodies. It evolves based on the changing alignment of interest groups, the 
national mood, partisan interests, and elections. Elected officials can affect the political stream by 
the messages they communicate to interested publics.  
Policy entrepreneurs are central figures in the MSF. Kingdon defined policy 
entrepreneurs as actors who are willing to invest their time and resources in promoting a policy. 
Policy entrepreneurs often advise policy communities on how to make their proposals more 
                                                   
22 Ibid., 165-95. 
23 Ibid., 172-79. 
24Reimut Zohlnhöfer, Nicole Herweg, and Christian Huß, "Bringing Formal Political Institutions into the Multiple Streams 




politically acceptable. After developing broad support, they work to couple policy proposals with 
the problem and political streams.25 
Policy entrepreneurs successfully couple particular problems, policies, and political 
considerations when they can persuade policymakers to add proposals to Congress’ decision 
agenda. Kingdon defined a government agenda as, “the list of subjects or problems to which 
governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, 
are paying some serious attention at any given time.”26 The decision agenda was defined as, “the 
list of subjects within the governmental agenda that are up for an active decision.”27 Kingdon 
hypothesized policy entrepreneurs were able to insert items in the decision agenda when a policy 
window opens up.  
Policy windows are temporary conditions that make coupling the multiple streams easier. 
The usefulness of the window concept has been criticized because it is difficult to predict or 
measure for empirical purposes.28 While Kingdon recognized the fuzziness of the concept, 
writing, “…the beast is complex and a bit opaque,”29 many of his interviewees cited the 
importance of timing when moving issues to the decision agenda.  
Policy windows open for a number of reasons. These include momentous focusing 
events that change the national mood, feedback on an existing program, changes in party 
leadership, deadlines for existing programs that must be reauthorized, a change in party control, 
or a change in presidential administrations.30 It should also be noted that on rare occasions a 
problem broker may be able to open a policy window, as Rachel Carson is said to have done with 
the publication of her book Silent Spring on the dangers of pesticide use.31
                                                   
25 Kingdon, 122-24. 
26 Ibid., 3. 
27 Ibid., 4. 
28 Zohlnhöfer, Herweg, and Huß. 
29 Kingdon, 171. 
30 Verna Smith, "Analysing Public Policy: Does Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework Help?," in Bargaining Power: 
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Modifications Based On Subsequent Contributions 
Since Kingdon published the MSF in the 1980s, other scholars have suggested revisions 
(Figure 2).32 For intellectual clarity, Knaggård suggested adding the concept of a problem broker 
to the framework. A problem broker “is a role in which actors frame conditions as public problems 
and work to make policymakers accept these frames.”33 They design messages using knowledge, 
values, and emotion to stimulate the attention of voters, elected officials, and policy communities. 
Knaggård hypothesized that factors contributing to their success are persistence, access to 
policymakers, credibility, and understanding both the audience and the national mood. Adding the 
concept of a problem broker facilitates the analysis of problem framing separately from policy 
development. Problem framing, then, affects the coalitions that can be assembled and the menu 
of policy options available for discussion.  
To obtain enactment of a policy, Zohlnhöfer, Herweg, and Huß. recommended adding the 
concept of political entrepreneurs.34 Political entrepreneurs are advocates with formal policy-
making authority, who can assemble majorities for passage by offering concessions, package 
deals, or by using manipulation. The goal of their efforts is to enact policy while insulating 
lawmakers from short-term political pressures, which is one of key factors Boston cites to enable 
long-term policymaking.35  
Grossmann’s study of 790 major policy enactments by the U.S. government shows that 
political entrepreneurs must deal with a subset of political actors who have long trusting 
relationships.36 Because the American system has many veto points, these subsets of   
Congressional and executive branch actors, which he labels governing networks, are required  to 
                                                   
32 Nicole Herweg, Nikolaos Zahariadis, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer, "The Multiple Streams  Framework: Foundations, 
Refinements, and Empirical Applications," in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M 
Weible (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2018). 
33 Åsa Knaggård, "The Multiple Streams Framework and the Problem Broker," European Journal of Political Research 54, 
no. 3 (2015). 





reach compromises and assemble policy packages that will attract a majority of votes for 
passage. A few prominent interest groups may assist in assembling the coalitions.  
With the addition of the problem broker and the political entrepreneur roles, the role of the 
policy entrepreneur becomes more tightly defined. In the restructured framework, policy 
entrepreneurs take on a bridging role, translating the output of policy communities from proposals 
based on evidence about how a policy can effectively address a social condition into the 
language of practical politics and model legislation. 
Lovell has drawn attention to the transnational diffusion of policy ideas and precedents 
that plays an increasing role among advanced democracies.37 International policy examples are 
especially important in demonstrating technical feasibility. Because they have been proven in 
other contexts, they can be readily adopted.  
Grossmann’s data show little correlation between the significant laws passed and 
measures of legislative agendas such as State of the Union mentions, elite editorial opinion, or 
public opinion. The only type of agenda building activity that appears predictive of laws passed is 
the number of Congressional hearings on a topic. Given this lack of empirical support, it seems 
the framework can be simplified with no loss of accuracy by eliminating the decision agenda 
entirely.38  
Boston catalogs a number of ways that individuals and organizations can bring concerns 
about future scenarios into the problem stream.39 These include risk assessments, horizon 
scanning, scenario analysis, and others. These activities are labeled as foresight efforts in Figure 
2 and add a fifth source of information to the problem stream. Foresight efforts seldom attempt to 
predict the future, but discuss a range of scenarios. They often focus on the risks and 
                                                   
37 Heather Lovell, "The Role of International Policy Transfer within the Multiple Streams Approach: The Case of Smart 
Electricity Metering in Australia," Public Administration 94, no. 3 (2016). 




uncertainties of future conditions.40 Foresight efforts enable governments to understand long-term 
problems by providing clear signals of future harms before they become crises. 









































Figure 2: Modified Multiple Streams Framework 
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Examining the Modified Framework 
How well does the modified multiple streams framework capture key variables in 
congressional policymaking? As an initial test, a case study of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act (Dodd-Frank; P.L. 111-203) was 
undertaken. A total of 394 events that influenced the Dodd Frank legislation were identified. 
Influence events, were defined broadly as a communications about the opinion of a person or 
organization on the regulation of financial institutions during the period in which the legislation 
was considered–from January 1, 2009 to July 22, 2010. These communications included 
conversations, meetings, hearings, documents, opinion surveys, and editorials.  
There is good evidence that members of Congress were aware of many of these 
communications. Many others were public communications that may have provided indirect 
influence on Congress by influencing public opinion. Each was classified by who originated the 
event, who received it, whose opinion was represented, and the results of the event if known. The 
study then organized those judged the most significant into a chronological narrative, followed by 
a discussion of how they related to the framework. 
A key source of information for influence events was a narrative provided by Robert G. 
Kaiser’s book, Act of Congress: How America’s Essential Institution Works, and How It Doesn’t.41 
During the development and passage of Dodd-Frank, Kaiser, a Washington Post reporter and 
author of several other books, was given broad access to Representative Barney Frank (D-MA), 
Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT), their staffs, and committee staff.  
To supplement Kaiser’s work, searches were performed on several databases for items 
mentioning either regulation or reform of the banking and finance industry during the time of the 
study. These searches yielded 13 articles from CQ Magazine about the process of the bill, 18 
articles from Pew Research on opinion surveys, a legislative history of Dodd-Frank detailing 69 
hearings on the bill from ProQuest Congressional, and 128 newspaper editorials from ProQuest 
                                                   




Newsstream. Finally, the Nexis Uni database was accessed to understand the amount of 
coverage given to the issue. 
The significance and reliability of the influence events documented for this study varied 
greatly. While it was important to cast a wide net to understand how events unfolded, it should be 
understood that a documented interaction of policymakers and other parties for which the 
outcome is known should be weighted differently from the existence of newspaper editorials that 
members of Congress may never have seen. Since this was only a test of the descriptive power 
of the modified framework, these differences did not matter as much as they would for test of 
predictive hypotheses. 
Dodd-Frank meets the criteria of a forward-looking policy as defined in this study 
because it addresses the long-term legacy problems of institutional weakness and reckless 
practices in the financial sector as well as abusive practices towards financial consumers. Its 
regulatory structure is flexible enough to meet a range of possible future developments, and it 
was created with the long-term goals to protect consumers and insure the stability of the financial 
system. Having no sunset, it should affect social conditions 20 or more years into the future 
unless changed by an act of Congress. 
Narrative of the Case 
In May of 2007, Harvard Professor Elizabeth Warren, who had been studying the 
underlying financial pressures on American families for many years, presented an academic 
paper titled “A Fair Deal for Families: The Need for a Financial Products Safety Commission” to a 
conference on managing risk. Representative Barney Frank was on the conference panel that 
responded to Warren’s paper and told the audience how difficult it would be to get the proposal 
through Congress.42 A summary of the paper was later printed in the journal Democracy under 
the title, “Unsafe at any Rate.”43 
                                                   
42 Larry Kirsch and Robert N. Mayer, Financial Justice: The People’s Campaign to Stop Lender Abuse (Sata Barbara, CA: 
Praeger, 2013). 
43 Elizabeth Warren, "Unsafe at Any Rate," Democracy, no. 5 (2007). 
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 Warren’s argument was that a substantial percentage of middle-class families were at 
risk of going broke at any downturn in the economy because of their indebtedness. Furthermore, 
the root of this situation was in deceptive and abusive practices of lenders. In addition, she 
argued the federal government was not adequately policing the area. She created a memorable 
symbol for her argument asking why families should have a Consumer Products Safety 
Commission to protect them from buying an exploding toaster, but no protection from incendiary 
mortgages or credit cards.44 
In 2007 and 2008, as housing values in the United States dropped abruptly, homeowners 
began defaulting on their mortgages, and political leaders started paying attention. On March 28 
2008, Senator Barak Obama (D-IL) made a speech at Cooper Union on financial reform and 
outlined principles calling for greater oversight, higher capital requirements, and new disclosure 
requirements for financial institutions.45 On March 31, 2008, Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
“Hank” Paulson (R ) also made a speech outlining a “blueprint” for regulatory reform.46 
As the summer wore on, banks, investment firms and insurance companies began to fail 
or teeter on the brink. The contagion was spread by mortgage-backed securities that had been 
widely traded because they promised a good return with solid collateral, were insured by well 
financed companies and had been blessed by respected credit rating agencies. In spite of these 
protections, they rapidly lost value.  
 In a near panic, Republican and Democratic leaders pushed a $700 billion bank rescue 
fund through Congress as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-
343). Called the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), it established few restrictions on how the 
Bush Administration could spend the money. TARP and a stimulus program later passed under 
the Obama Administration–the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 110-
343)–helped stabilize the economy.47 Despite these steps, the financial crisis eventually 
                                                   






destroyed the jobs of over eight million workers, slashed the average value of retirement 
accounts by one third, and put seven million families out of their homes through foreclosure.48 
Two years later, President Obama signed Dodd-Frank to rein in the risky practices of financial 
firms that had led to the crash, and to protect consumers from predatory loan practices.  
The well-documented evolution of Dodd-Frank provides a rich story of clashing and 
cooperating interests in American policy development. Lawmakers were caught between an 
angry public and a financial industry they had courted for financial support. Most institutions in the 
financial sector strenuously opposed Dodd-Frank because they stood to lose billions of dollars of 
profitable business under its restrictions and feared its sweeping new reporting and solvency 
requirements. Public opinion, however, had turned against “Wall Street” with strong suspicions of 
corruption and resentment against taxpayer-financed bailouts.49  
Eventually, Dodd-Frank passed, despite the opposition of a financial sector that spent 
$300 million lobbying Congress in 2009 and contributed $475 million to political campaigns in the 
2008 election cycle.50 The law that emerged as Dodd-Frank included provisions relating to 
financial stability of banking and insurance companies, transparency for investors, the regulation 
of financial derivatives trades, measures to limit risk in financial markets, protection for 
whistleblowers, protection of consumers of financial products against abusive practices, and 
mortgage market reform. The story of how this happened unfolded in six calendar quarters. 
2009 1st Quarter 
The Obama Administration and Congress, with Democratic majorities in both houses, 
began consideration of financial industry reform in January 2009, along with a crowded agenda 
that included an economic stimulus program, health reform, oversight of the TARP, and 
continuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Elizabeth Warren was appointed chair of the five 
member TARP Congressional Oversight Panel. On January 29, the panel released a report 
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recommending general principles for financial reform. Among these was a call for a “single 
federal regulator for consumer credit products.” These recommendations were later used in a call 
to action to form a consumer-labor coalition to advocate for financial reform.51 
Key congressional leaders met with Obama and members of the cabinet in February. 
They agreed to let the administration take the lead in drafting legislation. The chairs of the two 
key financial committees, Representative Barney Frank and Senator Chris Dodd, committed to 
supporting a consumer financial protection agency (CFPA).52 
Dodd spoke to both Republican and Democratic congressional leaders about including 
strong consumer protection measures as part of the reforms. Frank held a private discussion with 
Warren about how a consumer protection agency would work. In March, Secretary of the 
Treasury Timothy Geithner announced the administration’s principles for financial reform. These 
were focused on insuring financial stability rather than consumer protection.53 
During the quarter, Congressional committees held 19 hearings on different aspects of 
the financial industry. Many focused on the financial system stability, including topics of 
investment security fraud, derivatives legislation, TARP,  systemic risk in the financial system, 
implications from the failure of the American International Group, modernizing insurance 
regulation, financial risk management oversight, modernizing bank regulation, issues in deposit 
insurance, and lessons from the New Deal. Others focused on consumer welfare, including 
protection against abusive credit card practices, homeowner affordability, consumer protection in 
financial services, investor protection, mortgage lending reform, and enforcement of consumer 
protection laws. The interests represented by the witnesses were government officials in twelve of 
the hearings, business in nine, public interest groups in seven, and expert opinion in six.54 
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A Pew Research survey showed 60% of those interviewed supported stricter regulation 
of the financial industry and 36% said they were closely following news about it.55 Public facing 
media published 27,754 articles about financial regulation and reform, a 28% increase over the 
same quarter in the previous year.56 
2009 2nd Quarter 
In April 2009, 100 consumer, civil rights, fair lending and union organizations issued a 
Call to Action in support of enhanced consumer protection. The group later expanded to more 
than 200 groups and organized as a coalition called Americans for Financial Reform. They 
adopted the principles articulated by Elizabeth Warren in January as their platform.57 
In May, there were private discussions about bipartisan cooperation between Sen. Dodd 
and Sen. Richard Shelby, the ranking Republican member on the Senate Banking Committee. 
Shelby committed to work with Dodd, but could not commit his party’s leadership. Shelby later 
stated in an interview that there needed to be strong new regulation. In June, bipartisan staff 
negotiations began working on the legislation in the Senate. Republican staff seemed 
unresponsive, neither supporting Democratic staff proposals nor presenting their own. Senate 
Republican Leaders held a news conference to release their plan for financial reform, which only 
called for new reporting requirements. Kaiser reports it gained little attention in the press.58 
Hearings continued in both the House and Senate. There were twelve during the quarter. 
Again, there was a mix of topics between financial system stability and consumer welfare 
concerns. On the consumer side, these included mortgage reform, and truth in lending. On the 
financial stability side, hearings covered risks posed by large financial institutions, strengthening 
the SEC, a credit crisis for manufacturing firms, insurance regulation, credit rating agency 
regulation, TARP, municipal finance, derivative market regulation, and compensation structures in 
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financial firms. The interests represented by the witnesses were government officials in twelve of 
the hearings, business in seven, public interest groups in four, and expert opinion in nine.59 
The administration released a detailed white paper of their proposals in June and 
Geithner testified to the Senate Banking Committee about them.60 Private briefings were later 
held to inform Democratic members and their staffs about the proposals. The American Bankers 
Association took a position supporting reforms in general, but opposed the Consumer Finance 
Protection Agency as an unnecessary new bureaucracy.61 
Public oriented media articles on the issue continued at about the same level as the 
previous quarter, while interest in the industry trade press picked up significantly. The percent of 
the public saying they were closely following news about financial regulation dropped to 27%. 
Many regional and elite newspapers published skeptical editorials, wondering if financial reforms 
were correctly targeted, being considered too hastily, or creating unintended consequences.62 
2009 3rd Quarter 
The National Auto Dealers Association, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Mortgage Bankers 
Association, American Financial Services Association, and the American Bankers Association 
joined together in a lobbying campaign against a consumer protection agency. The coalition of 
200 public interest groups and trade unions, Americans for Financial Reform, began to lobby on 
its behalf. The business lobby had much greater resources and personnel than the citizens’ 
lobby, but the citizens’ lobby hoped to activate a nationwide grass-roots campaign in favor of 
legislation. Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel encouraged Frank to accelerate consideration of the 
CFPA because it was polling well with the public.63 
Twenty-six hearings were held on topics such as the impact of the financial crisis on 
community banks, the role of the Federal Reserve, the consumer protection agency, Security and 
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Exchange Commission oversight, financial fraud, hedge funds, consumer advocates perspectives 
on the proposals, preventing foreclosures, business perspectives on the proposals, systemic 
risks, regulatory perspectives on the proposals, insurance regulation, corporate governance, bank 
supervision, regulation of credit rating agencies, derivatives proposals, and international 
standards. The interests represented by the witnesses were government officials in twenty of the 
hearings, business in twelve, public interest groups in three, and expert opinion in fourteen.64 
The Senate and House agriculture committees had traditionally overseen regulation of 
derivative contracts because of their role in limiting risk of price swings for farm commodities. 
Chairs of the House Agriculture Committee and House Financial Services Committee reached 
agreement about joint oversight of the derivatives industry. This prevented a potential source of 
conflict over jurisdiction.65 
Business lobbies were active. Five hundred car dealers came to Washington to lobby 
their representatives in person, asking to be exempted from regulation by the proposed consumer 
protection agency. The Coalition for Derivatives End-Users was formed to minimize regulation of 
derivatives used to hedge against business risks. They differentiated their hedging needs from 
those of financial institutions using derivative contracts to speculate.66 
House legislative staff held meetings with lobbyists for banks, trade associations, 
individual corporations, consumer advocates, labor unions and others. Administrative and 
regulatory agency staff were also interviewed. The purpose was to identify issues and proposals 
for modifications to the pending legislation. Issues that staff could not resolve were forwarded to 
Chairman Frank for his decisions.67 
Sen. Shelby demanded that a consumer protection agency be eliminated from 
consideration as the price of further bipartisan negotiation in the Senate. Dodd broke off 
negotiations and asked Democratic staff to write the bill. Frank released a discussion draft of the 
                                                   






consumer protection agency to the House Financial Services Committee. He made minor 
adjustments to satisfy concerns of committee members.68 
Frank spoke at the National Press Club about the importance of the financial reforms and 
consumer protections. During the speech he signaled that he did not wish to harm community 
banks with the reforms and followed up with a letter expressing a desire to work with the head of 
the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA). The two met and made an agreement to 
exempt community banks and credit unions from most regulation by a consumer protection 
agency, and to change a formula for collecting FDIC fees that was worth $1.5 billion per year to 
ICBA members. ICBA dropped its opposition to the financial reform proposals. This reassured 
committee members they would not face opposition from a group of important constituents.69 
With the increased pace of Congressional activity, stories on television news about 
financial reform increased 38% over the previous quarter. Newspaper editorials were still finding 
fault with the process and the proposals. A Pew Research survey showed 54% of Americans 
believing stricter regulation of financial institutions was a good idea compared to 38% believing it 
was a bad idea.70 
2009 4th Quarter 
Twelve hearings were held concerning Federal Reserve perspectives on financial reform 
proposals, investor protection, oversight of private capital pools, problems with securitization of 
assets, the future of the mortgage market, restoring credit to manufacturers, the state of the 
banking business, the state of the U.S. housing market, high frequency trading, systemic 
regulation, bank overdraft fees, over-the-counter derivative sales, investor protection, and 
executive compensation. Representation of key groups in the hearings was fairly even with 
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government elites taking part in seven hearings, business representatives seven, public interest 
representatives five and experts five.71 
The American Bankers Association launched a lobbying campaign, requesting that 
federal regulatory standards preempt state regulation in regards to national banks. The argument 
that national banks should not be subject to 50 different state regulatory systems resonated with 
pro-business “New” Democrats whose votes were needed on the House Financial Service 
Committee. Frank promised them a floor amendment for federal preemption. The New Democrats 
threaten to oppose the rules under which the bill was to be considered in the House, but they 
worked out compromise language on preemption with House leadership, eliminating their 
opposition. Newspapers publicized how much the New Democrats were receiving in contributions 
from financial institutions.72 
Lobbyists on both sides began working to influence public opinion. Americans for 
Financial Reform organized demonstrations and call-in efforts in members’ districts to press for 
passage of reform measures, especially the consumer protection agency. They later called press 
conferences to highlight their support and involved states’ attorneys general to lobby for 
protection of states’ rights on financial regulation. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce launched a $2 
million advertising campaign against the consumer protection agency. Republican members of 
the House Financial Services Committee heard that the community bankers would not oppose 
the consumer agency and complained publicly that community bankers did not get enough 
regulatory relief in return for their new position.73 
The House Committee on Financial Services began a markup of the bills. Many changes 
to the underlying document were proposed and voted on. The Financial Services Committee 
reported a measure reforming derivative trading that required banking derivatives to be traded in 
a standard form through clearing houses, but carved out derivatives used by manufacturers and 
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other end users to limit their business risks. The Financial Services Committee agreed to an 
amendment to exempt car dealers from consumer agency regulation. It then reported measures 
to create a unified regulator for financial risk and the consumer agency.74 
Members of the Black Caucus who sat on the Financial Services Committee met privately 
with a group of African-American business owners and heard how the recession was affecting 
them. They concluded that the Obama Administration was not doing enough to help the African-
American business community and decided to use their committee votes on the reform package 
as leverage to get more help. Frank and members of the Obama Administration worked out a 
plan to respond to their concerns. The Black Caucus members did not believe it was enough but 
decided to boycott the final committee vote rather than vote against the reform package.75 
In December, the House Financial Services Committee had its final votes on elements of 
the financial reform package. They reported the measure without support of the Black Caucus 
members. Each reported bill became a section of a unified bill called the Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2009.  
Republican House leaders met with a hundred business lobbyists, asking their help in 
defeating the package. Republicans embraced talking points that the bill represented government 
overreach, would be a job killer, allowed more bailouts, and limited credit for small business. The 
bill passed the House, largely along partisan lines.76 
In November, Dodd released a “discussion draft” of the Senate legislation. Newspaper 
editorials found flaws. He made personal calls to Republican committee members asking for their 
input and cooperation. Shelby publicly criticized the process because there had not been a formal 
investigation into the causes of the financial crisis. He promised to deliver an alternative 
Republican bill, which never arrived. Dodd was successful at recruiting three bipartisan pairs of 
Senators to work on specific parts of the reform package. Dodd made a decision in December not 






to seek reelection, removing a potential obstacle to bipartisan cooperation.77 A chance meeting 
between a Finance Committee staff member and an official of the Bank for International 
Settlements led to the introduction of research and ideas about regulation of derivatives from 
international sources.78 
This quarter, news articles and broadcasts about financial industry regulation in public 
and business facing media were down slightly compared to the previous quarter. Magazine and 
journal articles, however, increased 28%, indicating an interest in longer, more analytical pieces. 
In polling, 45% of the public thought that stricter regulation of financial firms should be a top 
priority and 36% an important priority.79 
 2010 1st Quarter 
Newspaper editorials at the beginning of the year were generally supportive of the reform 
effort, but wondered if it was strong enough. Many commented on the amount of campaign 
contributions Obama and members of the finance committees have received from the financial 
industry.80 
The number of hearings dropped to only five in the quarter, only one of which related to 
consumers. They covered the idea of prohibiting banks from making high-risk investment with 
their own funds (the Volker Rule), tools needed by financial regulators, small business borrowing, 
and the impact of credit scores on consumers. Current and past government officials took part in 
three hearings, business representatives three, public interest representatives one and experts 
four. Around the same time, Pres. Obama delivered a speech advocating for the Volker Rule.81 
Sen. Dodd found it too difficult to negotiate the Senate bill with Sen. Shelby and began 
working with a less senior Republican committee member, Sen. Robert Corker. Corker proposed 
lodging the consumer protection agency within the Federal Reserve System. Dodd discussed the 
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idea with Democratic committee members. Democratic staff discussed the idea with consumer 
advocacy groups. Corker was not able to gain support from any other Republican senators for 
bipartisan efforts, so Dodd decided to issue his own version of the bill without Republican 
support. Dodd’s version did contain a number of compromises that had already been made with 
Corker and others. At the urging of Shelby, the bill was reported by the Senate Finance 
Committee without a committee markup. Knowing he would need some Republican support to 
achieve cloture, Dodd began building relationships with three moderate Republican Senators not 
on his committee, and solicited their views.82 
Public support and interest remained strong. Polls showed 59% of Americans supporting 
stricter regulation of financial institutions and 33% thinking it was a bad idea. Americans for 
Financial Reform activated its members to provide public pressure on senators to enact a 
consumer protection agency. In March, 900 bankers came to Washington to lobby against the 
reform package. Republican Senators Corker and Gregg told them financial reform was 
unstoppable because of the public pressure members of Congress were feeling. 
News articles and broadcasts about financial industry regulation in public and business 
facing media increased 30% over the previous quarter. Industry trade press articles increased 
16% and web-based publication increased 71%. Newspaper coverage was especially intense, up 
37% and broadcast news segments were up 34%.  
2010 2nd Quarter 
Republican Senate leaders held private meetings with Wall Street executives to discuss a 
strategy to modify the reform package. Senator Mitch McConnell then made a speech tying the 
reform package to unpopular Wall Street bailouts. Later he circulated a letter soliciting support 
from all members of his caucus for a filibuster of the bill. Several Republican Senators refused to 
sign.83 





Senator Blanche Lincoln, Chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee came out with a 
"tougher" proposal on derivative trading. It would have required big banks to spin off derivative 
trading operations that created $20 billion in profit per year for them. The measure passed in the 
Agriculture Committee. Dodd interpreted that as an effort by Lincoln to shore up her support in 
Arkansas for a tough primary fight. Dodd believed the changes were deeply flawed, but accepted 
them because he needed the support of the Agriculture Committee members and did not want to 
jeopardize Lincoln’s re-election chances.84 
Several focusing events took place during the quarter. The Security and Exchange 
Commission announced fraud charges against the Goldman Sachs investment firm. The Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a report about the collapse of Washington 
Mutual, the largest bank failure in U.S. history. Except for the Wall Street Journal, national 
newspapers including the New York Times, Washington Post, and USA Today were urging 
Democrats to ignore Republican and bank lobby objections and to pass a strong reform 
package.85 
Gallup surveys showed a majority of Americans in favor of the financial reform bill, but 
only by 46% to 43%. Support rose to 50% to 36% when the words used were “Wall Street” 
instead of "large banks.” Seven of ten Democrats supported the bill regardless of wording. Only 
22% of Republicans polled supported the bill when the phrase “large banks” was used, but 35% 
when the surveys referred to Wall Street.86 
Americans for Financial Reform posted advertisements calling on senators to support the 
bill. Obama gave speeches and interviews denouncing financial abuses and advocating for the 
reform package, saying it would, “hold Wall Street accountable.” With the exception of the Wall 
Street Journal, editorials in national papers were pro-reform. The Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations grilled executives from Goldman Sachs about their behavior. 
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There were only two hearings in the quarter on the financial reform package. The witness lists 
showed the opinions represented as government one, business one, public zero, expert one.87 
After two votes to consider the bill in the full Senate failed due to Republican opposition, 
a third vote was successful and debate began. The third succeeded, reportedly due to public 
pressure. Behind the scenes negotiation on how to wind down failing firms without creating a 
bailout fund finally succeeded. 150 lobbyists waged an intense campaign to get 30 changes in 
derivatives regulation—they won only six minor changes. An amendment to require big banks to 
have as much capital proportionately as small banks, favored by Republican Senator Susan 
Collins, was adopted. An amendment to exempt non-financial small businesses from regulation 
by the consumer protection bureau, favored by Republican Senator Snowe, was adopted 
unanimously.88 
A vote to invoke cloture and end debate then failed. Two Republican senators voted for 
cloture, but two Democratic senators voted against it. A third Republican senator, Scott Brown 
from Massachusetts was expected to vote in favor, but voted against cloture instead, after 
hearing complaints from his home state financial institutions. Frank, also from Massachusetts, 
provided him with a letter expressing commitments to work with him to protect the interests of 
large Massachusetts financial firms. Brown then agreed to vote for cloture. The final Senate 
debate began and the bill was passed.89 
News articles and broadcasts about financial industry regulation in public and business 
facing media increased 17% from the previous quarter. Industry trade press articles were up 
24%. Blogs up 37% and web-based publications up 56%.  
Public opinion was mixed. Pew reported a survey showing 54% of Americans thought 
stricter regulation of financial institutions was very important and 28% somewhat important. 
However, 46% of the public were worried government regulation of financial institutions might go 
                                                   






too far compared to 44% who are worried they would not go far enough. Only 22% of the public 
was following news about financial regulation very closely and 62% said it was hard to 
understand. Editorials continued to be mainly positive, but found fault in various aspects of the 
bill. The Wall Street Journal and some conservative regional papers criticized it as giving too 
much power to Washington bureaucrats.90 
Since the texts of the Senate and House bills were not consistent, a conference 
committee was called to agree on a common text. Frank decided to hold meetings of the 
committee in public, hoping transparency would minimize the influence of special interests. 
Americans for Financial Reforms published “10 Conference Priorities.” Committee staff members 
negotiated proposed compromises on the Volker Rule, derivatives and other matters. The 
committee worked several days and finally worked through an entire night to reach agreement. All 
proceedings were broadcasts by C-SPAN.91 
After agreement was reached, Sen. Brown balked because there was no mechanism to 
pay for implementation of the law. The conference committee reconvened and adopted an 
amendment dedicating part of TARP repayments and an increase of FDIC assessments on large 
banks to pay for the bill. With that change, the compromise bill was passed in the House with 
overwhelming Democratic support and a handful of Republican votes. The Senate closed debate 
with the support of Republican senators Snow, Collins and Brown and subsequently passed it.92 
On July 21, 2010 President Obama signed it into law as Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (P.L 111-203).  
Discussion 
The objective of this section is to assess the usefulness of the Modified Multiple Streams 
Framework (Figure 2) in understanding policy enactment. In contrast to a model or theory, a 
framework has been described as a shared platform that researchers can use to describe 
                                                   






phenomena, providing them with common conceptual categories, category relationships, and a 
set of assumptions. A framework seldom generates testable hypotheses by itself, but supports 
models that do.93  
The first factor reviewed was whether the actors and events could be easily classified 
using the framework. To assess that question, events from the narrative above were coded into 
sixteen categories corresponding to the variables shown in Figure 2 and notations were made 
about the direction of influence. The coding seemed intuitive, with little ambiguity about the 
concept to which each event belonged. All of the variables in the framework had at least one 
event that was recorded in the narrative except for foresight efforts and elections. The most 
prominently utilized categories in the narrative were policy entrepreneurs, interest groups, the 
governing network, and political entrepreneurs. The least utilized were social indicators, new 
knowledge, and international policy transfer.  
Frequencies of mention have little significance in evaluating the framework because the 
selection of events is not random, rather it is biased by the interests of the sources. Furthermore, 
frequency does not necessarily indicate impact. The important point is that the framework is able 
to capture the essence of the Dodd-Frank story. A summary of the events might go something 
like this: 
The focusing events of a financial crash, mass home foreclosures, and surging 
unemployment were framed by problem brokers as a case of irresponsible, reckless, and abusive 
financial institutions threatening the foundations of the economy and causing American families 
great pain. This created a national mood that remained supportive of a major regulatory 
expansion over six calendar quarters.  
Policy entrepreneurs brought ideas about policy responses to the table through 
publications, meetings with policymakers, testimony, interviews, and speeches. Political 
entrepreneurs in Congress built majorities for enactment of the bills by working with a loosely 
                                                   
93 Jenkins-Smith et al. 
31 
 
defined governing network of influential and like-minded senators and representatives. Along the 
way, they encouraged, received, and utilized a broad spectrum of advice from policy communities 
and interest groups.  
The political entrepreneurs worked to expand their governing network to a majority by 
persuasion about the value of the bill, involving members of their governing network in the design 
of the bill, encouraging the advocacy of supportive interest groups, and by offering concessions 
and side deals to influential interest groups as a way of easing members’ anxieties about 
alienating them.  
Interest groups on both sides of the issue advocated for their positions directly with 
members of the governing network, and with publicity to influence the national mood. Along the 
way, the political entrepreneurs had to navigate demands for bill provisions or procedures from 
party leaders who were concerned about positioning their parties for the next election. In the end, 
Dodd-Frank became an enacted policy through these efforts. 
A second question was whether the framework concepts were comprehensive, or if there 
were there significant factors that did not fit. Fourteen of the categories were from the framework 
while two of the categories, the news media and state government officials, had not been 
considered in the framework. The intervention of state official was very limited—primarily states’ 
attorney generals who lobbied against federal preemption of their power to regulate the 
operations of national banks in their states. The creation of a separate category for them in the 
framework could easily be avoided by thinking of them as an interest group. 
The news media is a more difficult case. During the six calendar quarters of the 
enactment, the Nexis-Uni database recorded over 180,000 news stories and editorials on 
financial reform, or 30,000 per quarter. In the year before bills were introduced, the rate was only 
5,000 per quarter. Was that high level of coverage simply a reflection of the national mood, a 
driver of it, or part of a positive feedback loop in which events and public interest drove coverage, 
which in turn drove public interest?  
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Kingdon’s interviewees dismissed the news media as an independent driver of policy 
development because it seldom brought them useful information and tended to only cover 
dramatic events for short periods of time.94 Recent work has indicated that media coverage can 
help advocacy groups by influencing the national mood and influence elected officials’ 
calculations about their next election.95 There are a number of instances when actors in the 
Dodd-Frank narrative used news media and advertising to attempt just that. However, the 
information they communicated was coming either from the events or the actors, so the news 
media might better be considered a mode of transmitting influence, but not an independent 
source. 
One concept that was found to be missing from the framework–by design–is institutional 
rules. The story of Dodd-Frank was affected by institutional rules in a number of ways that would 
become apparent if the framework was used in a comparative study. For instance, some factors 
that would not be found in a parliamentary system are:  
• The role of the president as a party leader, taking the lead in proposing a policy 
direction and promoting it to the public. 
• The need for two political entrepreneurs due to bicameralism. 
• The need for Senator Dodd to find a small number of minority party votes to 
break the filibuster. 
It is not necessary to deal with these in a study comparing various policy enactments under the 
same set of rules, but the concept will be added to the framework (Figure 3) as a reminder for 
comparative future studies. 
If news media and state officials can be viewed in these ways, and the Dodd-Frank case 
is typical, then the framework appears to provide a comprehensive system of classification for 
policy enactment in the U.S. Congress. Since we do not know if Dodd-Frank is typical, that 
conclusion must be considered tentative pending further studies. 
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Next, the question of whether the concepts were at a reasonable scale was considered. 
Would some have been more useful if combined or divided? The idea of including a role of 
problem broker was recommended to provide intellectual clarity to the multiple streams 
framework.96 However, in the Dodd-Frank case, it seemed unnecessary. While in theory, it is 
possible that those concerned with a social problem might only focus on framing and publicizing 
it, in practice those who discussed the problems of the financial crisis, such as Elizabeth Warren, 
also came with policy prescriptions.  
While the framework could be simplified by eliminating the problem broker concept and 
assuming that policy entrepreneurs typically work both on framing problems and proposing 
policies, there may be cases in which there is a definite split. The well-known case of Rachel 
Carson’s publication of Silent Spring comes to mind as an instance of someone who acted 
primarily as problem broker. Since these roles are not necessarily performed by the same person 
or organization, it seems best to accept the conceptual split while keeping in mind they are often 
combined in practice. 
Without question, splitting the roles of policy entrepreneurs and political entrepreneurs 
appears to enhance our insight. Individuals in these roles perform very different work. Policy 
entrepreneurs in the Dodd-Frank case focused on framing social conditions as problems, 
selecting among potential policy recommendations, and then using persuasion, evidence, and  
logic to gain acceptance. Political entrepreneurs, on the other hand, were political insiders who 
had to navigate the ambitions and anxieties of colleagues, the concerns of party  
leaders, and the pressures of interest groups to achieve majority support for their bills. This split 
between the political and policy entrepreneur roles has been embraced in a recent summation of 
the MSF by Herweg, Zahariadis, and Zohlnhöfer.97  
Finally, the question of whether the concepts were correctly positioned in the framework 
and if information seemed to flow in the direction indicated by the arrows. There were several 
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instances in the narrative that suggest changes should be made in the positioning of concepts 
and the direction of influence. The concept of partisan interests was more directly involved in the 
process than indicated in Figure 2. Party leaders, rather than amorphous partisan interests, 
intervened on several occasions, asking the political entrepreneurs to slow down or speed up on 
certain parts of the package, and they determined the level of bipartisan cooperation that was 
available. They also developed talking points for members to use when seeking to influence the 
political stream. 
Events in the case suggest that several arrows should be altered to show information 
flows. Both pro and anti-reform interest groups directed information at the public in an attempt to 
reinforce or alter the national mood. The information exchange between political entrepreneurs 
and the members of the governing network flowed in both directions; members often told 
entrepreneurs why they might be reluctant to vote for the policy proposals so the entrepreneurs 
could find solutions. Finally, there was strong two-way communication between party leaders, 
















































More than thirty years after publication of Kingdon’s multiple stream framework, the 
Dodd-Frank case demonstrates that it continues to provide a useful platform for understanding 
the policy process. Many of the updates proposed by policy scholars have improved the 
framework without disrupting its core logic. It recognizes both the flows of information into the 
political system as the raw material for policymaking and the role of human agency in shaping 
them into policy enactments. With one exception, only minor adjustments were needed to 
accommodate the factors found in this case study. 
The one exception is a recognition of the central role party leaders play. Given the stakes 
involved in gaining or retaining majority party control in Congress, it makes sense that party 
leaders will play an outsized role in deciding which legislation is considered, which legislation is 
blocked, which legislation is pressed forward, and how legislation is positioned to appeal to the 
public in the next election. Kingdon did not find political parties to be a major influence, although 
his interviewees mentioned them 23% of the time when speaking about infrastructure and 38% 
when speaking about health issues.98 However, partisanship has grown stronger in Congress 
since his research was done.99 Party leaders have always been important gatekeepers in the 
legislative process, but never more so than now.100 
Finally, to conclude that the framework accommodates enactment of forward-looking 
policies, we would have to believe that Dodd-Frank qualifies as a forward-looking enactment. The 
effort was undertaken in response to a current crisis, but it seems clear it was intended as a long-
term effort as implied in the title of the Obama Administration’s white paper, “Financial Regulatory 
Reform, a New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation.”101 The final result 
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was a mix of rules for the financial industry and a regulatory structure that would adjust them to a 
variety of future conditions. Without sunset provisions, the new institutional rules could easily last 
twenty or more years. On that basis, it appears to qualify as a forward-looking policy. 
With these final touches on the updated multiple streams model, Chapter 3 will examine 
how policy advocacy changes when problems are poorly understood future issues that have not 
yet become prominent to voters and policymakers. Chapter 3 discusses how the Bipartisan Policy 
Center uses a variety of strategies to gain the understanding, interest, and commitment of 
political entrepreneurs. Chapter 4 will then turn to the elements of successful enactment 




Chapter 3 The Bipartisan Policy Center: Lobbying for the Future 
While administrative agencies and congressional staff play a prominent role in the 
development of federal government policies, non-governmental organizations and independent 
experts are strongly represented as well. For example, during the enactment of Dodd-Frank, 
representatives from these groups accounted for 64% of the witnesses in committee hearings, 
with the other 36% being current and former government officials. In Kingdon’s study, interest 
group influence was noted in 84% of the interviews, making it the third most influential set of 
actors behind administration employees and members of Congress.102 
The MSF shows many ways in which non-governmental organizations influence policy 
development. These outside groups can monitor the problem stream and frame social conditions 
as public problems. They interact with policy communities consisting of administration officials, 
academic experts, and stakeholders. They can act as problem brokers and policy entrepreneurs 
to publicize information about social conditions, frame them as problems in the political stream, 
and bring solutions in the policy stream. They can educate, motivate, and gain the commitment of 
potential political entrepreneurs in Congress. They can frame temporary favorable conditions as 
policy windows to create a sense of urgency. As we saw in the Dodd-Frank case, interest groups 
that have large numbers of geographically dispersed members and the ability to mobilize them 
can obtain policy concessions by threatening the financial support and re-election prospects of 
elected officials.  
In the current context of American government, there are many entry points for non-
governmental organizations to influence the policy development and enactment process. The 
question raised in this chapter is how groups must alter their influence strategies when 
developing and advocating forward-looking policies to address long-term problems. After a review 
of the literature on forward-looking policy development, this chapter contrasts the advocacy 
strategy used by the Washington DC-based Bipartisan Policy Center on the well-known current 
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issue of infrastructure funding with its strategy on the uncertain, long-term issue of the nation’s 
energy mix. 
Literature Review 
What is the playing field that a forward-looking policy advocate faces? Jonathan Boston, 
who contributed an extensive study of forward-looking policymaking, cites barriers such as a 
pronounced short-term bias by many citizens, the uncertain nature of the future, uncertainty in the 
way policy will play out over long periods of time, and institutional weaknesses that fail to ensure 
long-term compliance for policies. These create a risky playing field for politicians.103 Boston’s 
work includes a theoretical examination of the presentist bias104 found in many democratic 
governments, then assesses research and thinking that has been done about remedies for it. 
These include structural changes in governmental processes, the use of commitment devices to 
insure the delivery of long term benefits, insulating policymakers from short-term pressures, 
advising policymakers on future issues, increasing the foresight capabilities of government, and 
the political conditions for policy development.  
Barriers cited by other authors include a history of projections about future conditions that 
were wildly off the mark, creating credibility issues for new warnings. Even those with good 
evidence of future risks are often ignored or ridiculed by powerful leaders with vested interests in 
the status quo.105 Short electoral terms of members of Congress that lead them to focus on the 
most urgent issues of their supporters.106 Finally, organizations that advocate for future issues are 
typically outnumbered and outspent by lobbying organizations representing the current interests 
of businesses, institutions, professional and ethnic groups.107  
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Despite the difficulties of enacting forward-looking policies, advocates are sometime 
successful. Joseph E. Aldy addressed this by studying three cases of forward-looking policy 
enactment in the U.S.–the Social Security Act of 1935 (P.L. 74-271), the Highway Revenue Act of 
1956 (P.L. 84-627) that established the Interstate Highway System and the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970 (P.L. 91-604).108 Lessons from these cases suggest that effective advocacy 
strategies include 1) designing policies to deliver broad, near-term benefits that lessen opposition; 
2) strategically linking unrelated interest groups, especially insurgent business firms that have 
more to gain than to lose from the new policy; and 3) mobilizing support from younger people who 
will receive more of the long-term benefits. This last is intriguing. With many citizens of 
economically advanced societies living into their 80s and beyond, mobilizing support for long-term 
policies from people in their 20s and 30s could be more of an exercise in rational self-interest 
than altruism for future generations. 
Alan M. Jacobs took a different tack in a study of eight major reforms of pension 
programs in Germany, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States.109 He found that, under 
certain conditions, political elites are motivated and able to enact policies that entail short-term 
costs because they offer long-term gains. He characterizes these as investment policies. Unlike 
short-term distributional battles between interest groups with zero-sum outcomes, long-term 
programs have the possibility of creating positive-sum outcomes. These programs become 
positive-sum when a short-term imposition of costs is paired with a credible mechanism to deliver 
greater future benefits. 
Jacobs defined investment policies as, “a choice with two key structural features: (1) the 
extraction of resources in the short term and (2) the dedication of those resources to a 
mechanism of intertemporal transfer….”110 An example familiar to Americans is the collection of 
Social Security taxes to fund the Social Security Trust Fund. Jacobs explores the political 
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conditions that caused policymakers in some countries to set aside pension funds for future 
obligations while policymakers in other countries opted to pay current year pension obligations 
from current year revenues.  
From his cases, Jacobs concluded there are three necessary conditions that allow 
governments to put forward-looking programs in place. First, governing elites must believe that 
voters will not punish them for imposing short-term costs. This is more likely when electoral 
competitiveness is low, when politicians can frame the short-term costs as minimal, and when 
there is a focusing event that makes clear the long-term costs of not acting. It is also more likely if 
one party is dominant, or if there is a cross-party consensus. 
Second, policymakers must believe the mechanisms they put in place will actually deliver 
the future benefits. This is often difficult to determine because of complex and uncertain social 
processes that react to any large-scale government program. In addition, future governments 
cannot be counted on to carry through with program commitments. Enactment of investment 
programs are more likely if the mental models of policymakers are reassuring on these points.  
Finally, policymakers must have the institutional capacity to enact the program into law 
over the objections of special interest groups. This will be more likely if a proposal does not 
impose significant costs on organized interests. Or, if it does impose costs on organized interests, 
success will be more likely if there are few “veto-points,” if policymaking authority is centralized, if 
leaders of organized interests believe there is a reliable mechanism for them to capture greater 
future benefits, or if they believe some action is inevitable and a proposal is the “least bad” 
alternative. 
A number of implications flow from this literature. To persuade members of Congress to 
enact forward-looking policies, advocates must reassure them that supporting their proposed 
measure will not jeopardize the members’ re-election. If Boston is correct about voters being 
present oriented, then we could expect it would be difficult for forward-looking advocates to make 
this argument if a policy will require near-term costs, such as increased tax rates. On the other 
hand, Jacobs presents evidence that the time preference of voters is very small. He argues that 
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grassroots skepticism about forward-looking policies has more to do with the risk that the long-
term benefits will not be delivered. Strong mechanism for future benefit delivery could well 
overcome a time preference slightly discounts future benefits. Jacobs and Boston both affirm the 
importance of having believable commitment mechanisms in policies in order to enact investment 
policies.  
Beyond reassurance about re-election prospects, Baumgartner et al. present evidence 
that it is necessary to build support with a large coalition of organized interests to create large 
scale policy change in the American context.111 A large, supportive coalition seemed critical in the 
Dodd-Frank case when 200 organizations joined Americans for Financial Reform to support the 
bill. Building and maintaining a large coalition may be difficult for forward-looking advocates, 
however, if organized groups are called on to pay the short term costs of a policy. Furthermore, 
organized groups typically have current interests to pursue, so their loyalty to goals that will 
unfold in decades may be jettisoned at the first sign of trouble for their short-term interests.112  
In summary, the work cited by Aldy, Jacobs, and Boston implies a number of strategies 
forward-looking policy advocates can use to overcome organized group or voter opposition. They 
can design broad near-term benefits into policies to gain voter support. Or spread costs broadly 
to avoid imposing objectionable costs on particular organized interests. They may find ways to 
delay the costs such as issuing debt for long lived infrastructure. They may be able to design 
automatic mechanisms to deliver the greater long-term benefits in return for short-term costs. 
They may be able to create a coalition with insurgent business firms that will benefit from a policy.  
Advocates could set a strategy of small incremental steps that may lead to a long-term 
policy goal without arousing strong opposition. The multiple streams literature suggests that 
advocates could also simply prepare their problem framing and policy proposals, build 
relationships with potential political entrepreneurs, and wait for a focusing event to create a 
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window of opportunity for a major initiative. With any of these strategies, the authors agree that 
framing is important. Advocates will be most successful if their proposed policies can be framed 
in terms of dominant popular values and in line with, or at least not contradictory to, the agenda of 
the majority party. 
Case Study: Strategies of the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) 
The method chosen for this portion of the inquiry is a case study of future and current-
oriented issue advocacy by a Washington DC-based advocacy organization. Since groups do not 
generally advertise themselves as advocates for forward-looking policies an initial sample of 
organizations was assembled by searching for issues the American public believes will be 
important in the future, and then identifying groups that work on those issues. The source on 
issues was a survey performed by the Pew Research Center in 2018 that asked 2,524 
respondents what issues should be top, important, or low priorities, “in order for the federal 
government to improve the quality of life for future generations” in the year 2050.113 This yielded 
ten issues. Republicans and Democrats expressed large differences of opinion on the first two 
issues, and broad consensus on the remaining eight. The issues were  
• Climate change: 90% of Democrats were very or fairly worried. 
• Undocumented immigrants: 65% of Republicans rated reducing the number of 
undocumented immigrants coming into the U.S. as their top priority. 
• Protecting retirement income: 72% expect people in 2050 will have a harder time paying 
their way in retirement. 84% believed that Social Security will either not be available or 
that benefits will be cut by 2050. 
• Healthcare access and affordability: 58% expect healthcare to be less affordable in the 
future and 68% said that providing high-quality, affordable health care to all Americans 
should be a top priority of government. 
• Technology-driven underemployment: 82% believed that robots and computers will do 
much of the work currently performed by people. 49% believed workers will have less job 
security. 
• Public debt: 63% say the national debt will continue to grow. 
• Energy security: 67% believe a world-wide energy crisis will definitely or probably happen 
before 2050. 
• Income inequality: 73% believe the gap between rich and poor will widen and 62% 
believe the lower class will grow. Only 20% believed the average standard of living for 
American families would get better by 2050. 
• Government effectiveness: 86% said they were very or fairly worried about the way the 
government in Washington works. 
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• Educational quality: 77% worried about the ability of public schools to provide a quality 
education for students in the future. 
A search for interest groups that advocate on at least one of these issues in the 
Washington Information Directory 2019-2020114 found 125 listed. For each issue-area, there were 
at least ten organizations identified. Many were listed in more than one category. To further refine 
the selection of this sample of organizations, their websites were examined, looking for evidence 
that they worked to promote forward-looking policies to Congress. That eliminated thirty-five of 
the organizations that either did not work with Congress, or focused primarily on near-term 
concerns. While many policies have both near-term and long-term implications, the definition from 
Chapter 1 was used to differentiate them–a forward-looking policy addresses a long-term problem 
with a solution flexible enough to meet a range of possible future developments, and a policy 
outcome that relies on long-term goals or future scenarios at least 20 years into the future. 
The remaining organizations fell into two broad categories–think tanks and organizations 
that directly engage in lobbying activities. Fortunately, the Bipartisan Policy Center operates as a 
think tank, but has a partner organization, the Bipartisan Policy Center Action Network, that 
lobbies Congress (jointly BPC). An examination of its website (bipartisanpolicy.org) and lobbying 
records on Open Secrets115 demonstrated that it works on all of the issues identified in the Pew 
study with the exception of income inequality. In 2018, its staff included 22 registered lobbyists, 
and BPC took positions on 66 bills then being considered by Congress. This certainly indicates a 
robust level of lobbying activity. 
Two of BPC’s policy areas stood out as contrasting examples for this study: energy and 
infrastructure. A review of BPC’s website revealed energy proposals oriented towards a long-term 
transformation of the sector while its infrastructure proposals are largely meant to address current 
funding problems. Both energy security and climate change are rated highly in the Pew survey 
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cited above, while infrastructure was not. This contrast revealed different policy design 
considerations and advocacy methods for future and present-oriented policy advocacy. 
To make sense of BPC’s advocacy strategies, 346 documents culled from the 
organization’s website and other sources were reviewed concerning their think tank work and 74 
lobbying reports from the Open Secrets website, primarily from the five years between November 
1, 2014 and October 31, 2019. The think tank documents fell into five categories of influence 
attempts by the organization: reports, events, testimony, letters, blog postings, pages on their 
website, and podcasts. From these, 26 issues were identified that related to energy and 14 issues 
related to infrastructure. The Findings section below includes tables showing the distribution of 
influence attempts by issue and type. The blog postings and podcasts were eliminated from the 
analysis because most simply repeated what was in the other types of communications. 
Background 
Democrat Jason Grumet and Republican Cameron Lynch founded BPC in 2007 with the 
goal of encouraging members of Congress to tackle long-term issues on a bipartisan basis.116 In 
the beginning, they planned to focus on health care, relations with Iran, and climate change. Past 
Republican and Democratic leaders of the U.S. Senate endorsed the idea and were actively 
involved in its formation. BPC soon attracted significant funding from corporations and 
foundations.  
Grumet and Lynch’s idea was to be bipartisan—not nonpartisan—and have the views of 
both parties strongly represented on task forces and staff, hashing out feasible compromises on 
significant issues, then lobbying for their adoption. Grumet hoped that task force members would 
represent “…seventy or eighty percent of the political spectrum.”117 A defining characteristic of 
BPC seems to be the early involvement of retired political leaders to find a political middle ground 
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on significant issues. To put BPC in context, among the eighty DC-based public interest think 
tanks and advocacy groups identified in this study, BPC is relatively new, having been founded in 
2007. It has achieved significant size with a $23 million annual budget, ranking 21st among this 
group, and has a staff of 122, including many who formerly served in government policy roles.  
BPC’s work on energy began in 2008 when it formed the American Energy Innovation 
Council (AEIC). AEIC’s mission was to study the nation’s energy options and make 
recommendations. It was composed of prominent business CEOs assisted by technical experts. 
Their work was embodied in a 2010 report called, “A Business Plan for America’s Energy 
Future.”118 The forward-looking nature of this effort was made clear in the introduction to the 
report: 
As business leaders, we feel that America’s current energy system is deficient in ways 
that cause serious harm to our economy, our national security, and our environment. To 
correct these deficiencies, we must make a serious commitment to modernizing our 
energy system with cleaner, more efficient technologies. 
Such a commitment should include both robust, public investments in innovative energy 
technologies as well as policy reforms to deploy these technologies on a large scale. By 
tapping America’s entrepreneurial spirit and longstanding leadership in technology 
innovation, we can set a course for a prosperous, sustainable economy, and take control 
of our energy future. 
Conversely, if we continue with the energy status quo, we will expose ourselves to risks 
that pose significant threats to our way of life.119 
This report formed the basis for BPC’s early policy recommendations concerning energy 
by focusing on a forward-looking program of research and commercialization of new 
technologies, funded by a tripling of federal expenditures on energy technology research. BPC’s 
proposals met the criteria of forward-looking policy as defined for this study because they 
addressed the emerging problem of shifting the nation to cleaner, more sustainable energy 
systems that would take decades to accomplish. Focusing on research and development followed 
by private sector commercialization was flexible enough to meet a range of possible future 
                                                   





developments concerning what would be researched, what developed, and what would be 
commercialized. It rested on a vision of an energy future that would certainly take 20 or more 
years to achieve. 
By contrast, BPC’s work on infrastructure began in 2015 with this conception of the 
problem: 
BUSINESS CAN HELP BRIDGE THE INFRASTRUCTURE GAP 
America faces a $1 trillion infrastructure funding crisis. Government alone can’t fully fund 
all of the roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure our economy needs – let alone 
upgrade our airports, shipping hubs and water facilities to meet the challenges of the 
coming decades. Private investors, working together with government, will have to step 
up with additional resources in order to bridge the gap.120 
The shortfall in infrastructure funding was viewed as an immediate crisis. A 2014 book by 
Grumet cites the fact that the American Society of Civil Engineers gave the U.S. a grade of D+ for 
its infrastructure and estimated it would take $3 trillion to make it acceptable.121 BPC’s energy 
strategy could be summarized as triple federal budgets for basic research and wait for 
commercialization of new energy technologies by entrepreneurs over a period of decades. A 
summary of its infrastructure efforts might read that we have an immediate problem rooted in a 
lack of funding, so find ways to make infrastructure investments attractive to private investors as 
soon as possible.  
Findings 
What difference did it make in BPC’s strategies that one area involved a long-term 
problem and one concerned a near-term problem? On both issue areas, BPC used a combination 
of communication efforts meant to educate policymakers and direct lobbying. The big picture can 
be seen in the types of communication efforts BPC made in the five years under study. Its 
website lists 160 energy and 161 infrastructure efforts in this period. As shown in Table 1 below, 
their work on energy put a greater emphasis on reports and events than their work on 
                                                   





infrastructure. This differing profile of communication events suggests BPC’s staff saw a need for 
more detailed interaction to educate policymakers and create the political support for a forward-
looking policy change. 
Table 1 Comparison of Communication Efforts 
 
 
Table 2 Infrastructure Communication and Lobbying Efforts - November 1, 2014 – 
October 31, 2019122 
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Communication Efforts  Energy Infrastructure
 Report                23                     9 
 Event                38                   21 
 Press Release                28                   11 
 Blog                62                   97 
 Podcast Episode                  2                   18 
 Page                  5                     5 
 Person                  2                   -   
 Total              160                 161 
Infrastructure Topics Reports Events
Testimony/
Letters Lobbying Total Percent
Cummiulative 
Percent
Regulatory Reform 3 9 3 20 35 22% 22%
Private Financing 5 8 1 15 29 18% 40%
Water 6 7 1 6 20 13% 53%
Government Funding 2 5 1 11 19 12% 65%
Barriers 3 4 1 2 10 6% 71%
Asset Inventory 2 4 1 0 7 4% 75%
Innovation 2 5 0 0 7 4% 80%
Rural Infrastructure 1 0 1 5 7 4% 84%
Centers 3 3 0 0 6 4% 88%
Public Health & Education 3 2 1 0 6 4% 92%
Taxation 1 2 0 2 5 3% 95%
Regional Approaches 3 1 0 0 4 3% 97%
Affordability 1 1 1 0 3 2% 99%
Natural Disasters 0 1 0 0 1 1% 100%
Total 35 52 11 61 159
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Table 2 shows the range and frequency of BPC’s infrastructure communication events. 
Fourteen identifiable topics were found in these communications, but the six most frequent topics, 
amounting to 43% of topics represent 75% the activity. All but one of the topics relate to BPC’s 
overall diagnosis of the problem and proposed solution–a shortage of government funds and the 
need to bring private capital into the funding of public infrastructure.  
The communication efforts showed that BPC was engaging with the wider infrastructure 
policy community in a variety of ways to both create and popularize policy solutions. Kingdon saw 
this interaction as an essential process of circulating ideas to soften up policy communities so 
they would take ideas seriously.123 Some examples of these communications were 
• A fact sheet on the infrastructure funding gap and the barriers preventing private 
investors from providing funds.124 
• A symposium on innovative infrastructure financing.125 
• A report on how to modernize infrastructure.126 
• A letter to the 2016 presidential candidates on infrastructure.127 
• A report on utilizing private capital for rural infrastructure.128 
BPC also advocated for additional sources of government funding, but its main focus was 
on removing the regulatory barriers to private investment. A concern with aging water and sewer 
systems in the U.S. is the only outlier in the mix. Forward-looking ideas about infrastructure, 
embodied in potential innovation funds and having research centers, were given little attention. 
With a couple of exceptions, BPC did not take a visionary stance of asking if the nation would 
need the same mix of infrastructure in twenty or thirty years. 
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Table 3 Energy Communication and Lobbying Efforts - November 1, 2014 – October 31, 
2019129 
 
BPC’s communications around energy were more extensive, intensive, and diverse than 
its messages on infrastructure as shown in Table 3. Twenty-five identifiable topics were found in 
the energy communications compared to fourteen for infrastructure. Like infrastructure, its energy 
efforts were unevenly distributed. The ten most frequent topics, amounting to 40%, accounted for 
76% of its activities. Eight of the most frequent ten deal with technical innovations that would take 
many years to develop, commercialize, and bring to scale. 
Similar to its work on infrastructure, BPC used a diverse set of venues and methods to 
soften up energy policy communities to its ideas. Some of examples of BPC’s focus on innovation 
were 
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Energy Topics Reports Events
Testimony/
Letters Lobbying Total Percent
Cummiulative 
Percent
Innovation 16 9 15 26 66 15% 15%
ARPA-E 3 2 5 33 43 10% 25%
Government Funding 7 6 10 19 42 10% 35%
Energy Diversity & Security 12 6 5 14 37 8% 43%
Nuclear Power 6 6 4 18 34 8% 51%
Fossil Fuels 5 5 5 14 29 7% 57%
Carbon Capture 2 1 5 17 25 6% 63%
Energy Efficiency 7 5 8 4 24 5% 69%
Climate Change 8 7 3 0 18 4% 73%
Renewable Energy 4 2 0 9 15 3% 76%
Energy Storage 1 2 5 6 14 3% 79%
Regulation 2 12 0 0 14 3% 83%
Electric Power 4 8 0 0 12 3% 85%
Regulatory Reform 5 1 5 0 11 3% 88%
Trade 1 2 3 4 10 2% 90%
Centers 3 0 1 4 8 2% 92%
Coalition 2 1 4 0 7 2% 94%
Economics 4 3 0 0 7 2% 95%
Economic Benefits 2 2 2 0 6 1% 97%
Permitting 3 0 1 0 4 1% 97%
International Comparisons 2 1 0 0 3 1% 98%
Modeling 3 0 0 0 3 1% 99%
Regional Cooperation 1 2 0 0 3 1% 100%
Labor 0 1 0 0 1 0% 100%
Litigation 0 1 0 0 1 0% 100%
Total 103 85 81 168 437
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• An event to discuss the relationship between federal research and development 
and advanced battery technology.130 
• A report on the state of energy innovation in the U.S.131 
• Congressional testimony on energy innovations in the U.S.132 
• A report analyzing proposed policies under the Obama Administration’s Clean 
Power Plan.133 
• A symposium engaging a former Energy Secretary on the need for nuclear power 
expansion.134 
Discussion: Comparing BPC’s Strategies on a Current and Long-term Issues 
In the five years of this study, BPC initiated many activities that were identified in the 
literature review as necessary conditions for policy change. In 2015, it appeared that a window of 
opportunity for policy change on infrastructure was opening. The American Society of Civil 
Engineers had identified the problem of deteriorating infrastructure and a lack of funding. By 2016 
both of the major party candidates for president were advocating increased infrastructure 
spending, but Congress had failed to find a sustainable source of funding for highways.135 In 
response, BPC’s Executive Council on Infrastructure had authored a report detailing policy 
changes that could make infrastructure financing attractive for private investment.136  
During this period, BPC courted potential political entrepreneurs by giving senators 
prominent roles in their events and recognizing their support in blog postings and press releases. 
Its lobbyists worked consistently over five years to spread the word among policymakers as 
shown in every quarterly lobbying report.137 It formed a coalition with top level business groups.138 
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Also, BPC attempted to influence the Trump administration by submitting a transition memo on 
infrastructure and a first 100 days plan.139 
In contrast to its infrastructure work, BPC’s energy work envisioned a forward-looking 
transition to a new mix of energy sources over a period of decades. They argued this could be 
achieved through a strong increase in government funding for research and development and 
commercialization by the private sector. 76% of its documented communications and lobbying 
concern innovation on all forms of energy to provide more energy security and address climate 
change—key concerns of respondents to the Pew poll on 2050 issues.  
Advocating for a new mix of  requires a much more diverse message than, we need $2 
trillion for infrastructure--here is how to get it. It encompasses regulatory relief and research for 
advanced nuclear power, encouragement for renewable energy, carbon capture technologies to 
compensate for the fossil fuels we will still be using in the decades ahead, and better energy 
storage technologies for the electric grid. This diversity of approach required more reports and 
events to educate policymakers. The core recommendation to triple federal energy research 
budgets140 supported most of these initiatives. Investing more in research and development is a 
prime example of a forward-looking policy because it requires spending funds in the present for 
future benefits that may or may not materialize. 
How well does BPC’s energy work support the implications outlined in the literature 
review? First, it appears they either discounted the importance of grassroots support, or assumed 
with Boston that voters are too impatient to care about a long-term strategy for energy. There was 
no evidence of citizen panels being used in formulating their policies or outreach efforts to the 
general public. Instead, they relied on recommendations of elite businesspeople, former 
government officials, academics and professional staff. With the exception of several regional 
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meetings with local and state officials, all of their documented outreach efforts were aimed at the 
Washington policy community. 
Next, there was no evidence they were able to build as large and powerful a coalition or 
organized interests as they did for infrastructure. The only evidence of an energy coalition 
referred to around fifty universities, businesses and nonprofits that supported increased research 
spending.141 With the exception of the nonprofits, the citied organizations would directly benefit 
from increased research funding. This hardly compares with BPC’s infrastructure coalition 
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, North 
American’s Building Trades Unions, and others lobbying for $2 trillion in funding.142 The limited 
coalition they did build for energy included some insurgent business firms, the type of potential 
allies that Aldy identified. 
In the absence of a powerful coalition, BPC’s energy strategy is consistent with playing 
the role of a policy entrepreneur. It has built a broad portfolio of credible, incremental policies that 
their lobbyists can bring up when the opportunity arises. Their 22 lobbyists are armed with 
analytical reports supporting the policies and often have fact sheets providing overviews. Through 
their face to face meeting, events, and blogs, they keep the policies in view and wait for focusing 
events that provide opportunities to advance them. While they have not achieved their goal of 
tripling the federal energy research budget, they have achieved success in urging Congress to 
increase funding in the face of the Trump administration suggesting severe cuts.143 
Finally, they have thought strategically about framing their energy policies. BPC’s 
materials speak about their push for research funding with a focus on popular bipartisan 
American values such as innovation and entrepreneurialism.144 There is no evidence in the 
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documents that they support carbon taxes or cap-and-trade legislation, which would contradict 
typical Republican positions of low taxes and less regulation on business. BPC has framed 
energy research funding as very low-cost relative to the federal budget, but as a good investment, 
which, like previous government funded research, would pay for itself many times over through 
private sector investment, new company formations, patents, and academic publications.145 It 
helped their argument that once the research is done, it does not require the assent of a future 
Congress to benefit the country–their literature assumes the private sector naturally finds ways to 
create benefits through commercialization of new technology. Whether enough policymakers 
assume that is a strong enough commitment mechanism to assure the  delivery of long-term 
benefits is an open question. 
Conclusion and Next Steps 
This chapter explored how BPC used one strategy to advocate for governmental policies 
that address a current problem and a different strategy for policies that address future conditions. 
Pending further research, we can assume these differences are not random, but are caused 
because present-oriented advocates and forward-looking advocates face different political 
realities. Among those differences are the difficulty for forward-looking advocates of building and 
maintaining grassroots support, the difficulty of building and maintaining powerful coalitions, a 
greater need to educate policymakers, and a need to frame proposals within popular values that 
are supportive of party agendas.  
As in all case studies, it cannot be claimed that BPC’s experience represents the best 
strategy to advance its proposals, that its experience can be generalized to other organizations, 
or that they would have made the same choices in other time periods. Only further research could 
confirm that forward-looking advocates face a political reality different from actors dealing with 
current issues and that these differences mandate different strategies. It does speak well for 
BPC’s energy strategy that their incremental goal of increasing federal support for energy 
                                                   




research has partially succeeded in the face of Trump Administration opposition while its 
infrastructure initiative has failed despite an apparent bipartisan consensus on the need for 
additional funding and a broad business-labor coalition supporting it. The proof of whether its 
energy strategy is viable will come if they continue to advance incrementally towards policies that 




Chapter 4 A Tale of Two Bills 
Using the modified MSF, insights from the literature, and the findings of the Dodd-Frank 
and BPC cases, how can we understand the process of enacting forward-looking policies in 
Congress? To develop propositions, this study relies primarily on ideas from Jacobs’ Governing 
for the Long Term: Democracy and the Politics of Investment146 and Boston’s Governing for the 
Future: Designing Democratic Institutions for a Better Tomorrow.147 As discussed in Chapter 3, 
these are the most comprehensive works found in a literature search concerning the ways 
democratic governments enact policies that are sensitive to long-term conditions.  
This study differs from Jacob’s and Boston’s work in one important way–both authors 
emphasized the impact of institutional arrangements. Jacobs’ case studies considered 
institutional arrangements as variables. A large portion of Boston’s work focused on how 
institutional arrangements can be altered to decrease the “presentist” bias in democratic 
governments. Zohlnhöfer made the sensible recommendation that institutional factors could be 
added to the MSF,148 however, in this research, the American institutional context was treated as 
a given, recognizing that the findings must then be limited to the American context.  
Based on Jacobs’ and Boston’s work, and assuming a stable institutional context in the 
U.S. Congress, it appears there are three areas of activity that must be addressed for a forward-
looking policy to be enacted: 1) problem brokers must frame legacy or emerging social conditions 
as public concerns and create compelling narratives about the need for government action in both 
the policy and political streams, 2) policy entrepreneurs must couple the problem with policy ideas 
and recruit political entrepreneurs in the face of great skepticism, and 3) political entrepreneurs 
must obtain the support of party leaders and gain majority support for enactment within a 
governing network.  
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In line with Kingdon’s model, these activity areas are not presented as stages of policy 
development, but as necessary conditions that could be addressed in different orders. The 
American policy world is a fluid one, in which political entrepreneurs may search for problems to 
enhance their reputations. Leaders in governing networks may focus on increasing their 
institutional capacity before a policy proposal arrives. A policy’s journey to enactment may start at 
different points in the framework, be stalled, start again at a different point, and go through 
multiple cycles of development before it passes. 
To test the realism of these ideas, this chapter develops specific propositions and then 
explores how they played out in two qualitative case studies. The cases discuss attempts to enact 
major environmental laws in Congress. The first case is the successful enactment of The Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1970 (CAA70; P.L. 91-604). The second is Congress’s failed effort to 
address climate change in 2009-2010 (Cap and Trade). The focus was to find out if all the 
elements listed below were present in the successful case while some were missing in the 
unsuccessful case.  
The Work of Forward-Looking Problem Brokers 
Forward-looking problem brokers may focus on well-known legacy conditions from the 
problem stream that will require several decades to address. An example is an analysis by the 
Brookings Institution showing that the median wealth of Black American families is only 10% of 
the median wealth for white families.149 Their data shows that this differential has been persistent 
over almost 40 years and, with the long-term history of racial discrimination in the U.S., it seems 
reasonable to assume this has always been the case. Is this a public problem that government 
policy can address, or a regrettable social condition no feasible policy can mitigate? The job of a 
problem broker is to create awareness of a legacy condition like this, advance its framing as a 
public problem, and motivate others to search for policy solutions.   
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Alternatively, problem brokers may focus on future conditions they expect, but which 
have not fully emerged. Framing emerging conditions as public concerns begins with foresight 
efforts such as horizon scanning, trend analysis, risk analysis, modeling, and scenario 
analysis.150 Ideas about emerging problems often come from mandated reports of governmental 
institutions such as the Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics, or the Governmental 
Accountability Office (GAO). Nongovernmental organizations such as academic institutions, think 
tanks, and commercial services also publish foresight efforts. An example from the 
nongovernmental sector is the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Reports.151  
Boston suggests it is very difficult to motivate action with foresight efforts alone when 
policymakers must also deal with a host of current issues. Venkataraman argues projections 
about the future and historical analogies have poor motivational value because they are always 
multiple and disputed. Often projections deny human agency to alter future conditions.152 Brokers 
for long-term problems must marshal evidence and create compelling arguments, just as trial 
attorneys would. Ideally, they provide reliable evidence that failure to take early action will cause 
serious future problems or opportunities lost.153  
Foresight efforts and legacy conditions are simply the raw materials for the definition of a 
public problem. Effective problem brokers frame messages about foresight in familiar terms, 
values, and symbols to make them more salient to both policymakers and voters, often with 
explicit reference to the costs of not acting in the short-term.154  Often social conditions become 
more salient as problems if they are framed with villains, as Wall Street institutions were 
portrayed in the Dodd-Frank case. Problem brokers are successful to the extent they can alter the 
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motives and incentives of policymakers, especially by creating the threat of electoral punishment 
if no action is taken.155  
As well as creating awareness and concern, under Knaggård’s definition problem brokers 
seek to frame conditions as public problems. This implies that the conditions can be addressed 
through public policy at an acceptable cost. If not, they will be seen as intractable and not 
motivate either policy or political entrepreneurs. News of a legacy or emerging problem can lead 
to fatalism unless a path to a better future state can be imagined; political actors are motivated by 
visions and plans emphasizing some level of control over the future.156 The problem stream 
provides the raw materials to fashion a narrative, but the problem broker must inject an element 
of hope in it to motivate action. 
The Work of Forward-Looking Policy Entrepreneurs 
We might expect that policymakers will require forward-looking policies to meet the 
normal criteria of technical feasibility, value acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints. 
The long-term aspects of their costs and benefits, however, create additional criteria that policy 
communities must consider in developing them. These are due to the uncertainty inherent in 
policies meant to last decades. A key part of a forward-looking policy entrepreneur’s role is to 
reduce the uncertainty about future conditions and about the effectiveness of the proposed policy 
in addressing them. Forward-looking policies must be robust enough to deliver benefits under a 
wide and uncertain range of future conditions.157 
Despite projections of future benefits, forward-looking policies requiring near-term costs 
can be controversial due to the uncertainty that the future benefits will materialize as expected. 
Policies that take decades to show significant results often depend on complex and unpredictable 
causal chains.158 Future governments may subvert the policy by diverting resources to other 
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uses. Under these conditions of uncertainty, Jacobs concluded a policy must include a 
mechanism to deliver long-term benefits that is believable under the common mental models of 
members of the governing network.  
In response to these concerns, policy entrepreneurs can pursue a number of commitment 
or balancing mechanisms to insure policy stability. Commitment devices are mechanisms that 
increase the costs of future changes. Boston provides examples that include requirements for 
future governments to perform certain actions, limits on their actions, cross-party agreements, the 
creation of rights enforceable by courts, automatic triggers for policy changes, trust funds, 
transferring decision-rights to independent bodies, and mandatory reporting requirements.159 A 
balancing mechanism is one in which the timing of costs corresponds with the timing of the  
benefits–for instance borrowing to finance long-life infrastructure with interest and principal  
payments made by the same generations enjoying the benefits. 
Boston’s reference to cross-party agreements raises the issue of how long-term policies 
can survive changes in government control. If a policy must survive a decade or more to show 
results, it must be acceptable to each of the potential majority parties. In the U.S. bipartisan 
system, this is critical because party control often shifts within a decade or less. Bipartisan 
support may be especially important in this era of unstable majorities and often divided 
governments.160  
As related in Chapter 3, the Bipartisan Policy Center framed their proposed energy 
policies in this way, avoiding support for carbon taxes or cap-and-trade legislation, either of which 
would be unacceptable to most Republican members. BPC instead focused on increased energy 
research funding as a very low-cost alternative relative to the federal budget, but a good 
investment that would pay for itself many times over as the private sector commercialized the 
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research.161 It strengthened their argument that once the research was done, it would not require 
the assent of a future Congress to benefit the country–in their model, the private sector will 
naturally find ways to commercialize research for the benefit of all.  
The Work of Forward-Looking Political Entrepreneurs 
Boston cites obtaining high-level political backing as one of the key challenges facing 
advocates for forward-looking policies, a view supported by Grossmann’s research.162 Political 
entrepreneurs capable of assembling majorities in Congress, are rare however. Research by 
Bernhard, Sewell and Sulkin identified a small minority–slightly less than 4% of members of 
Congress–as ambitious entrepreneurs who are the likely to build coalitions to pass bills, often on 
a bipartisan basis.163 The importance of the capacity to build bipartisan support in the governing 
networks was recently supported in research by Curry and Frances showing that 96% of laws 
enacted by Congress between 1985 and 2016 had some bipartisan support in at least one 
chamber.164  
There may be an even smaller number of political entrepreneurs willing to work on 
forward-looking policies that create unpopular near-term burdens and may not show their worth 
until long after the entrepreneurs are retired. Despite these deterrents, Boston, Jacobs, and 
Aldy165 all found cases in which policymakers led efforts to enact long-term policies. Perhaps 
these forward-looking political entrepreneurs care strongly about creating good policy or have an 
eye to their place in history. 
When political entrepreneurs make the commitment to enact a forward-looking policy, 
there are special concerns that do not arise with near-term policies. If there are near-term 
burdens that will be imposed, they will face concerns from their governing network members 
about interest group opposition. Jacobs argues that policy advocates blunt the opposition of 
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powerful groups through a variety of strategies. These advocates may design policies in ways 
that diffuse costs broadly so the impact on organized interests is minimal, or by providing 
believable mechanisms to direct significant long-term benefits to the same groups that incur the 
near-term costs, limiting the menu of feasible options from which groups can choose, creating 
broad coalitions for policy change to prevent rent-seeking from any particular group, or limiting 
veto points that groups can exploit166  
A bipartisan agreement in the presence of a focusing event, especially if the event 
provides a clear signal of future losses, can also provide electoral safety. Jacobs found that was a 
factor in the case of the U.S. 1977 Social Security reforms. Voters were willing to accept the near 
term pain of tax increases because there were projections of Social Security difficulties that were 
specific and concrete, making it easy for voters to imagine the cost of doing nothing.  
Finally, in the face of strong opposition and the absence of public pressure from effective 
problem brokering or a major focusing event, political entrepreneurs may pursue an incremental 
strategy of partial–but politically possible–enactments that move Congress towards a 
comprehensive policy. This strategy was not found in the literature reviewed, but was followed by 
the Bipartisan Policy Center. Their end goal was to achieve policy enactments that would 
radically change the mix of energy sources used in the American economy, but their incremental 
goal was to achieve an increase in federal support for energy research and development. 
Propositions 
If this characterization of the legislative process is realistic, then enacting forward-looking 
policies in the U.S. Congress requires the cooperation of problem brokers, policy entrepreneurs, 
and political entrepreneurs to accomplish specialized tasks that are not required with current 
issues. The specialized tasks are derived from the nature of problems relating to future 
conditions, which generally involve a higher degree of unknowns, uncertainty, and risk than well-
researched current problems.  




Based on the MSF and the insights from the literature and cases of forward-looking policy 
development, the following propositions were explored. It appears that enactment of forward-
looking laws in the U.S. Congress will be more likely when the following conditions are met: 
• Problem brokers: 
o Mobilize public pressure by framing expected social conditions as public 
problems that will cause specific harms if nothing is done, using narratives 
emphasizing focusing events that evoke emotions, values and hope as well as 
reason. 
o Educate policy communities and policymakers at a higher level than for well-
understood short-term problems. 
• Policy entrepreneurs: 
o Develop proposals that meet the normal policy criteria of technical feasibility, 
value acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints. 
o Provide rationales about how the recommended policies will minimize future 
harms, including mechanisms to assure the delivery of long-term benefits despite 
uncertain future social and political conditions. 
o Include broad near-term benefits, if possible. 
• Political entrepreneurs: 
o Evaluate whether political conditions are favorable for enactment of a 
comprehensive policy, an incremental policy, or not favorable for any policy 
enactment. 
o Gain and maintain the support of party leaders. 
o Reassure members of the governing network about electoral security. 
o Offer concessions or alternative benefits to overcome the resistance of influential 
organized groups bearing the near-term costs of the policy. 
o Gather enough bipartisan political support to prevent the policy from being 
overturned at the next change of government. 
Findings: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (91-604) 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (CAA70) was a forward-looking environmental 
law that created enforceable national air quality standards in the U.S. for the first time. The law 
required the newly formed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set standards based solely 
on human health risk, without regard to cost for the six most common air pollutants, and required 
states to submit plans to achieve those standards. Industrial plants that emitted pollution were 
required to obtain permits and auto manufacturers were required to achieve a 90% reduction in 
emissions from their fleets by 1975.167 
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Since its enactment, the EPA reports that concentrations of pollutants in the nation’s air 
such as nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and lead have all dropped by amounts 
between 62% and 99% despite significant economic and population growth during the period.168 
In 2007, a ruling by the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Clean Air Act to regulate the 
emission of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide.169 The effect of that ruling has yet to be 
decided due to changing policy at the EPA. 
CAA70 qualifies as a forward-looking act because it addresses the long-term legacy 
problem of unhealthy air quality. It was enacted without a sunset date, so would operate in 
perpetuity unless amended by Congress. In remarks during the Senate debate, Chairman of the 
Public Works Committee Senator Jennings Randolph (D-WV) expressed his expectation that its 
effects would be felt by generations twenty years into the future.170 With subsequent 
amendments, it has continued to operate for fifty years.  
CAA70’s design was flexible enough to meet a range of possible future developments. It 
invested states with the responsibility to create their own implementation plans, created a process 
for industries to dispute standards and requirements, allowed the Director of the EPA to suspend 
deadlines that proved unrealistic, and for the federal government to change its air quality 
standards as new information was discovered. Finally, CAA70 had a justification that relied on 
long-term goals of creating healthier air for the nation. 
Problem Brokers 
Mobilize public pressure by framing expected social conditions as public problems that 
will cause specific harms if nothing is done, using narratives emphasizing focusing events 
that evoke emotions, values and hope as well as reason. 
The early 1970s saw an exponential rise in public concern about all types of pollution. 
Rachael Carson’s 1962 book detailing the effects of DDT and other chemicals, Silent Spring,171 
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was on the New York Times bestseller list for 31 weeks. Its success spawned a number of other 
popular books, including John Esposito's Vanishing Air,172 Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb,173 
and Joseph Sax’s Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action.174 It appears that 
this work had a significant impact because the membership in national environmental lobbying 
organizations grew from 123,000 in 1960 to 819,000 in 1969.175 
During this period, presidential hopeful, Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME), used his 
position as Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution to act as a problem 
broker. In 1963 he held six days of committee hearings on water pollution and three days of 
hearings on air pollution. Using these hearings, he was able to characterize pollution as a public 
health problem. In 1964, he held air pollution hearings in six cities to build awareness.176 
There were also a number of focusing events that brought the public’s attention to 
pollution in general and air pollution specifically. An oil well off the coast of Santa Barbara, 
California blew out and fouled beaches with an estimated 20,000 gallons of crude oil per day. 
Industrial pollution on Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River caught fire.177 A “choking smog” covered the 
entire East Coast during summer 1970.178 Each of these events served to focus public attention 
on the need for air quality legislation. 
The focusing events and efforts by problem brokers had an impact on public interest and 
concern. As demonstrated by the New York Times, the use of the term “environment” increased 
significantly in the late 1960s. In 1965, it used the term in the title of articles only twice; in 1970, it 
was used 86 times. Between 1965 and 1970, surveys showed respondents believing air pollution 
was a serious problem in their area rising from 28% to 69%. Surveys showed the public’s 
estimation of pollution’s importance rose from the bottom of a list of domestic public issues in 
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1969 to the second highest after inflation in 1971.179 On April 22, 1970, an estimated 20 million 
people participated in the first Earth Day to show their concern.180 
Educate policy communities and policymakers at a higher level than for well-understood 
short-term problems. 
There was little evidence in the documents consulted for this study that problem brokers 
were reaching out to educate policymakers about the problems of air pollution in great numbers. 
In 1969, there were only two full time lobbyists serving the environmental movement in 
Washington.181 An analysis of the 123 witnesses who testified at hearings in the House and 
Senate on CAA70 revealed that only 6% were identified with advocacy organizations and only 4% 
were academic experts.182 The hearings were dominated by witnesses from industry (46%), 
executive branch and state government officials (32%), and members of Congress (18%). The 
only nationally known environmental leader to testify at a hearing was Barry Commoner and none 
of the national environmental advocacy groups were represented. Environmentalist Paul Ehrlich 
did meet with Senator Gaylord Nelson and inspired him to begin organizing the first Earth Day. 
Senator Muskie used his numerous hearings to educate his colleagues about the issues involved.  
Policy Entrepreneurs 
Develop proposals that meet the normal policy criteria of technical feasibility, value 
acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints. 
Surprisingly, it did not seem that some of the normal policy criteria applied in this case. 
Proponents conceded in the Senate debate that certain deadlines for the auto industry might not 
be technically feasible–that technology to meet the standards did not yet exist. The report on the 
bill by the Senate Committee on Public Works states, The Committee determined that “…1) the 
health of people is more important than the question of whether the early achievement of ambient 
air quality standards protective of health is technically feasible….”183 Also, the benefits were 
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assumed to be great enough that higher costs were not viewed as a problem. President Richard 
Nixon mentioned in his 1970 State of the Union speech that higher costs would be built into the 
price of products and higher costs for consumers were also acknowledged in the Senate 
debate.184  
This law has been characterized as the establishment of a right to clean air, regardless of 
cost or technical feasibility.185 The rights concept was reinforced by a provision in the bill 
authorizing citizen suits when its standards were not met. By the near unanimous margins that 
the bills were passed in both chambers, it would seem the “rights” approach overcame the normal 
criteria of value acceptability. 
Anticipation of future constraints was built into the law. The EPA was given the ability to 
delay deadlines that were not feasible and alter criteria in light of new scientific knowledge. It was 
mandated that the standards be evaluated every five years to account for the latest scientific 
information. When flexibility did not prove adequate, Congress stepped in to amend the law in 
1977 and 1990, under both Democratic and Republican administrations.186 
Provide rationales about how the recommended policies will minimize future harms, 
including mechanisms to assure the delivery of long-term benefits despite uncertain 
future social and political conditions. 
The CAA70 was passed partially in response to the perceived failure of the Clean Air Act 
of 1963 (P.L. 86-493), which left pollution control in the hands of states and municipalities. Few 
states were making progress by 1970. Proponents of the CAA70 argued that national ambient air 
quality standards, based solely on human health risk, would remedy the weaknesses of the 
earlier bill. The bill required states to develop implementation plans, which could be rejected by 
the EPA. It required industrial plants to be licensed by the federal government and new plants to 
use the best available pollution control technology. Automobile manufacturers were required to 
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meet stringent emission standards, regardless of whether effective technology was available. 
Finally, the bill provided grants to states to staff their regulatory agencies.187 
Include broad near-term benefits, if possible. 
The promise of lower emissions leading to cleaner air could certainly be considered a 
major, broad, near-term benefit. A review of the report on the bill by the Senate Committee on 
Public Works and the language of the bill revealed no others.188  
Political Entrepreneurs 
Evaluate whether political conditions are favorable for enactment of a comprehensive 
policy, an incremental policy, or not favorable for any policy enactment. 
The mood of the nation in 1970 has been characterized as “demoralized” by a divisive 
and probably unwinnable war in Vietnam, anti-war protests, the assassinations of President John 
F. Kennedy, Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., and race riots in major 
cities.189 It has been suggested that political leaders were motivated to find a unifying issue like 
environmental improvement that could bring the country together. With the success of focusing 
events and problem broker efforts in mobilizing the public, it appeared the time was ripe.190 
From 1963 to 1967, Sen. Muskie pursued an incremental strategy by leading efforts to 
pass the Clean Air Act of 1963 (P.L. 86-493), which expanded research and assistance to the 
states, the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-272), which established 
emission standards for automobiles, the Water Quality Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-234), which 
established water standards for interstate waterways, the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 
(P.L. 89-753), which provided funds to help implement the 1965 act, and the Air Quality Act of 
1967 (P.L. 90-148), which established regional air quality standards. During this period, Muskie 
also held numerous oversight hearings to evaluate the effectiveness of these laws.191 
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Gain and maintain the support of party leaders. 
On the Republican side of the aisle, Pres. Nixon sent clear signals of support for the 
CAA70 by emphasizing environmental issues in the his 1970 State of the Union Address, by 
issuing a detailed message to Congress about his environmental goals, and by having his 
administration prepare a draft bill.192  Republican members of Congress responded by sponsoring 
the bill in equal numbers with Democrats, testifying in support of the bill at hearings, and by 
providing near unanimous support in voting for it.193 
Neither Democratic Speaker of the House John McCormick (D-MA), nor Senate Majority 
Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MO) appear in histories of the enactment. Given the near unanimous 
votes for the CAA70 in both chambers, it is safe to assume that they were in support of the efforts 
to enact the bill, but their role is unclear. Sen. Mansfield later made very positive comments about 
Sen. Muskie’s role in building support for anti-pollution programs.194 It may be that both 
McCormick and Mansfield were strong supporters of the efforts, or it may be party leaders simply 
deferred to the judgment of committee chairs more. 
Reassure members of the governing network about electoral security. 
No evidence was uncovered showing that special concessions had to be made to 
reassure members about their electoral security, as there were in the Dodd-Frank case. Members 
were willing to vote for CAA70 despite objections of the coal coalition, which were important 
interests in the districts and states of many representatives and senators.195 Given the 
groundswell of public support for the bill, even members with dominant fossil fuels and 
automotive interests in their states and districts may have believed voting against the bill would 
have created more of a threat to their re-election than voting for it. 
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Offer concessions or alternative benefits to overcome the resistance of influential 
organized groups bearing the near-term costs of the policy. 
Representatives of industry groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Edison 
Electric Institute, and the National Coal Policy Conference testified in the House’s hearings on the 
CAA70. These organizations opposed the idea of national air standards, but decided, in light of 
the intensity of public opinion, they would simply recommend that the standards be “minimal” 
ones.196 Representatives of these groups were able to meet over the summer of 1970 with 
members of Nixon’s industry-oriented National Industrial Pollution Control Council. They agreed 
that stringent legislation was inevitable and their best strategy was to stay quiet on the legislation 
and afterwards influence the regulatory process at EPA in their favor.197 
Under the CAA70, new industrial plants were required to use the best available pollution 
control technology, regardless of costs. At the requests of industry lobbyists, Muskie agreed to 
grandfather older power plants, refineries, and factories until they were upgraded so they would 
not have to add the most modern air pollution equipment immediately. This eased opposition from 
the business community. Muskie assumed he was giving nothing away, because all of the older 
plants would have to be replaced in a reasonable amount of time. However, industry found ways 
to extend the lives of many of these plants far beyond what was expected.198 
Gather enough bipartisan political support to prevent the policy from being overturned at 
the next change of government. 
The effort to pass air pollution legislation was strongly bipartisan from the start. This was 
not unusual as environmental legislation gathered an average of 90% of the votes in Congress in 
the 1970s.199 The House bill had four Republican co-sponsors and four Democratic co-sponsors.  
Recognizing the popularity of the environmental movement, Nixon positioned himself as 
pro-environment and, in his 1970 State of the Union Address, framed it as a nonpartisan issue 
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that would strongly affect a generation of young Americans if the country failed to act.200 Soon 
after the State of the Union, Nixon sent a message to Congress outlining legislative proposals he 
advocated to improve environmental quality and his administration provided a draft clean air 
bill.201  
The administration proposal was warmly received in the Democratic-controlled House of 
Representatives Commerce Committee, where a number of witnesses expressed enthusiasm for 
it over seven days of hearings.202 The House quickly passed a somewhat stronger version of the 
bill by a vote of 374 to 1. Senator Muskie’s subcommittee drafted an even stronger version, which 
was reported out to the Senate by a unanimous vote of the Committee on Environment and 
Public Works. It then passed the full senate by a vote of 73 to 0.203 A conference committee 
issued a bill close to the Senate’s, which was passed by both chambers, and Nixon signed it into 
law on December 31, 1970. 
Findings: Cap and Trade Legislation 2009-2010 
The last significant Congressional effort to limit the emissions of greenhouse gases in the 
U.S. came in the early days of the Obama administration, when Democrats controlled both 
chambers of Congress. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 imposed caps on 
emissions and provided incentives for energy efficiency, renewable energy and technological 
innovation. It passed the House, largely along partisan lines in 2009. A similar bill, the American 
Power Act, was introduced in the Senate with the hope that Republican co-sponsors could be 
found. There was a great deal of lobbying to change the balance of costs and benefits among the 
various stakeholders. In the end, the 60 votes needed for cloture on the issue could not be found 
and it was never put on the floor.204 These joint efforts in the House and Senate will be referred to 
as “Cap and Trade.” 
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If enacted into law, the bill that passed in the House of Representatives would have set a 
hard cap on greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. and enforced it with a system of allowances 
allocated to industries according to their historic emissions. Any allowances not used in a 
particular year could be banked for future use or traded to other companies that needed them. 
This system is commonly referred to as cap and trade, and had been successfully employed to 
lower the levels of sulfur dioxide in the U.S. Each year, the overall number of emission 
allowances granted was slated to decline until, in 2050, emissions would only be 20% of what 
they were in 1990. However, after the introduction of a companion bill in the Senate, a majority for 
passage could not be assembled after many months of trying. 
Cap and Trade fit well within the criteria for a forward-looking law. The findings language 
in the House bill addresses a long-term problem, citing the scientific consensus on climate 
change that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has been growing since 
the 1800s and there would likely be an increase in global average surface temperatures by 2100 
in the range of 2°F to 11.5°F depending on emission levels.205 It was designed to affect social 
conditions until 2050 through its emission standards. Its flexibility to meet a range of possible 
future developments was demonstrated by fourteen mechanisms that would allow adjustments to 
compensate for unexpected conditions affecting businesses, states, consumers, and workers.206 
Finally, its justification relied long-term goals to lower greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 
and to affect an estimated $1.3 trillion in energy infrastructure development expected between 
2009 and 2030.207 
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Mobilize public pressure by framing expected social conditions as public problems that 
will cause specific harms if nothing is done, using narratives emphasizing focusing events 
that evoke emotions, values and hope as well as reason. 
Former Vice President Al Gore, Senator Barak Obama (D-IL), Senator John McCain (R-
AZ), the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and many others sounded the alarm 
on climate change in the years leading up to the Cap and Trade effort.208 Gore's documentary “An 
Inconvenient Truth” was viewed by millions and became the 11th highest grossing film 
documentary in history.209 These messages appeared to be making an impact because a 2007 
New York Times poll showed 90% of Democrats, 80% of Independents, and 60% of Republicans 
favored immediate action to reverse global warming. Later polling by a consortium of universities 
showed Republican support dropping off, however, as Republican-leaning organizations 
published counter narratives questioning the science.210  
It appears that these messages were having some emotional impact on the public as 
63% admitted to being very or somewhat worried about global warming in the university study, 
but 65% reported they had not yet personally experienced the effects of global warming. A 
majority of the respondents expected the next 20 years to bring more serious impacts including 
droughts, severe heat waves, intense hurricanes, extinctions, famines, forest fires, epidemics, 
refugees, and poverty.  
While public opinion had coalesced around the need to do something, intensity of feeling 
was lacking. In polling, climate change was ranked 10th in importance out of 11 issues in a 2008 
Yale-George Mason University study, and its ranking changed little in subsequent years. In 2010, 
a Pew Research survey, respondents ranked climate change 21st in importance out of 21 national 
issues.211 
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The groundswell of public support was nowhere near that of the 1970s. To follow up on 
the success of An Inconvenient Truth, Gore conceived and executed a $300 million advertising 
and organizing campaign called "We." It was planned to mobilize 10 million climate activists, but 
the campaign ignored grassroots groups already working on the issue and only gained 2.5 million 
members by 2009.212  
In 2007, 643 grassroots groups had come together to form a climate education campaign 
called 1Sky, with the goal of gaining a cap on emissions to reduce them 25% from 1990 levels by 
2020 and create five million green jobs. At its height, it had 2,300 field volunteers in 29 states.213 
Educate policy communities and policymakers at a higher level than for well-understood 
short-term problems. 
This study found limited evidence that problem brokers made significant efforts to 
educate policymakers about climate change. President of the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
Fred Krupp met with Senator Lindsay Graham to educate him about the basic facts of climate 
change and convinced him the crucial measure Congress could take was a hard cap on 
emissions. Graham later became a key political entrepreneur on the issue.214 During the 2008 
presidential campaign, Gore met with Obama to update him about the potential of renewable 
energy to substitute for coal.215 
Policy Entrepreneurs 
Develop proposals that meet the normal policy criteria of technical feasibility, value 
acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints. 
It appears that the policy developed in Cap and Trade met all of the normal criteria. The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated there would be a small positive effect on federal budgets 
through 2019 from the bill and that it anticipated future constraints by containing fourteen 
mechanisms to provide financial flexibility.216 The Energy Information Administration estimated 
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the cost of the bill to American families at a modest $ 0.50 per day.217 Earlier success with a cap 
and trade system for sulfur dioxide emissions, enacted during the Administration of President 
George H. W. Bush, provided evidence of technical feasibility. That program had reduced 
emissions 50% at a cost of $3 billion, far less than industry projections of cost.218 
The cost estimate from the Energy Information Agency was contested as critics shifted 
from calling climate science into question and began arguing the cost of Cap and Trade was too 
high. The National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce commissioned 
and publicized a study from a consultancy called Charles Rivers Associates that projected 40% 
increases in electric rates by 2020 if the bill was passed and a net loss of four million jobs by 
2015. To refute this, the EDF created a study that aggregated the results of five academic studies 
about the economic impact of Cap and Trade and claimed it would only lower economic growth 
by a modest 0.5% by 2030.219  
Provide rationales about how the recommended policies will minimize future harms, 
including mechanisms to assure the delivery of long-term benefits despite uncertain 
future social and political conditions. 
The U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), an industry-environmental group alliance, 
published a 24 page Blueprint for Legislative Action describing a policy that was designed to 
reduce greenhouse gas emission in the U.S. 80% from 2005 levels by 2050 through a cap and 
trade system. To gain industry support, it included significant offsets and free allowances to 
current emitters. Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA), Chair of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee, based the Cap and Trade bill on this model.220 EDF publicized the model 
as a market-based solution, in which the government would not have to choose winners and 
losers, but could let the market decide which companies and technologies had the best solutions 
to greenhouse gas emissions.221 
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Waxman’s bill included an overall cap on the amount of greenhouse gases that could be 
emitted in a year, controlled by a system of allowances. The cap was mandated to reduce each 
year until annual emissions were only 20% of 1990 emissions in 2050. While there was great 
flexibility in handling economic shocks from the program, there were no exceptions in the bill 
allowing the mandated reductions to be waved without an act of Congress.222 
Include broad near-term benefits, if possible. 
The near term benefits in Cap and Trade were meager. There were provisions for loans 
and loan guarantees to help businesses manufacture more efficient products, assistance for 
states to set up various efficiency programs, a voucher program for consumers to purchase fuel 
efficient vehicles, and assistance for low income families if energy prices rose beyond a certain 
level.223 Efforts were made by supporters to claim the bill would create many green jobs, but there 
was no mechanism in the bill to insure job creation would be greater than job losses in fossil fuel 
industries.224  
A bipartisan effort to achieve a simpler bill with broad near-term benefits was carried out 
by Senators Maria Cantwell (D-WA) and Susan Collins (R-Me) who authored the Carbon Limits 
and Energy for America's Renewal (CLEAR) Act. Their bill capped emissions, auctioned permits 
to emit, and sent the proceeds to American families as a "dividend" averaging $1,100 per year. 
This was designed to compensate for the extra cost built into energy prices due to the emission 
cap. A Public Opinion Strategies poll showed three quarters of Americans in favor of the "cap-
and-dividend" plan with similar levels of support by Republicans and Democrats. It was 
introduced late in the process--December, 2009. The Washington DC-based environmental 
groups did not want to switch approaches at that point, believed it was a distraction, and it was 
not seriously considered.225  
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Evaluate whether political conditions are favorable for enactment of a comprehensive 
policy, an incremental policy, or not favorable for any policy enactment. 
The outlook on whether there was a window of opportunity for Cap and Trade in 2009 
was mixed. When the House took up the legislation, Representatives Waxman and Markey, 
Speaker Pelosi, and allied environmental groups believed the time was right to push for a climate 
bill for a number of reasons. Former Republican Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA) had 
participated in an advertisement with Speaker Pelosi (D-CA) stressing the importance of 
addressing climate change in a bipartisan way. Both President-Elect Obama (D) and his 
opponent in the election Senator John McCain (R-AZ) had taken stands in favor of climate 
legislation during the presidential campaign. Obama had specifically endorsed an economy-wide 
carbon cap and cutting back greenhouse gas emissions to 20% of 1990's level by 2050.  
Rep. Waxman had ousted the skeptical Representative John Dingell from his 
chairmanship of the House Energy and Commerce Committee on the promise that he would 
move climate legislation. Public awareness and support on the issue was strong, although this 
was tempered by polling showing the public did not consider it one of the top issues the 
government should address.226  
Despite success in the House, there were signs of trouble enacting a bill in the Senate. 
Fossil fuel and electric utility interests had spent more than $3 billion on lobbying between 1993 
and 2009, leading to the defeat of three major climate bills in the Senate between 2003 and 2008, 
and they continued to spend heavily in 2009.227 In the summer of 2008, gasoline prices escalated 
in the U.S. to almost $4.00 per gallon and the Senate passed a resolution early in 2009 by a vote 
of 89-8 indicating that any climate bill must not increase energy prices.  
All of the candidates in the Republican presidential primaries other than McCain had 
come out against climate legislation and the industrial company members of USCAP began to 
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waver in their support as the economy sank into recession.228 The grassroots alliance 1Sky was 
lukewarm to Cap and Trade because of the concessions made to industry in the House. 1Sky 
finally decided to oppose the bill in the Senate when sponsors eliminated EPA's regulating 
authority for greenhouse gases.229 An advertising campaign by environmental groups promising 
"More jobs. Less Pollution. Greater Security" if the bill was passed was contested by industry 
advertising warning of massive job losses. Finally, polling by a Gore-connected organization 
showed public support for immediate action on climate dropping off.230 
Gain and maintain the support of party leaders. 
There was also a mixed picture in terms of party leader support for political entrepreneurs 
trying to assemble majorities. Among President Obama, Senate Majority Leader Reid, and 
Speaker Pelosi, only Pelosi seemed committed to quick congressional action. She urged Rep. 
Waxman to put climate legislation on a fast track in the House and participated in whipping the 
votes for it.231 
During the presidential transition, Obama promised his administration would move to 
establish a federal cap and trade system for emissions with annual targets to bring them down by 
80% by 2050, but transition aides told reporters that statement did not indicate a timetable for 
legislative action. Obama appeared to support the effort rhetorically, but held back from personal 
involvement. Instead, he left coordination on the bill with staff people and expected Congress to 
develop the details of the bill. In contrast to their strong action on Dodd-Frank, the administration 
did not develop language for a bill, or even a memo on what they wanted to see in it.232 When it 
came time for the House to vote, Obama did step forward to lobby individual members.233  
Senator Barbara Boxer, Chair of Senate Environment and Public Works Committee 
began work on Cap and Trade in 2009. Republican members boycotted a committee mark-up 
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session and the bill was reported by the committee in November with no Republican support. 
Since there was no evidence of the bipartisan support that would be needed in the Senate to 
reach a threshold of 60 votes, it was dropped from consideration. At that point, Senators John 
Kerry (D-MA), Joe Lieberman (I-CT), and Lindsay Graham (R-SC) began working together to 
create a "grand bargain" between the parties that would pair a cap on emissions with increased 
production of natural gas, nuclear power, and offshore oil drilling.234 
Obama’s Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel told the senators that if they could not find 60 
votes to support Cap and Trade in the Senate, the White House could not exert much effort to 
help.235 Emanuel did not believe it was possible to find the 60 votes and advised them to find an 
incremental climate bill that could pass, such as a renewable energy mandate on utilities, but the 
senators rejected the idea.236  
Majority Leader Harry Reid had made no commitment to move climate legislation in the 
Senate. He said he would put the bill on the agenda for early consideration if the president asked 
him to, but a request from Pres. Obama never came.237 Reid resisted bringing it to the floor 
because the sponsors had not been able to find Republican senators who would support it other 
than Graham.238  
Reassure members of the governing network about electoral security. 
By the time Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham began working to assemble a majority in the 
Senate, it was difficult for them to reassure Republican senators about electoral security. 
Grassroots Republican support for a bill had weakened considerably and many were actively 
opposed. A survey by the Pew Research Center in 2010 showed 53% of Republicans were not 
convinced that the Earth was warming, so it was unlikely that Republicans lawmakers would be 
penalized by their constituents for opposing a bill.239  









Tea Party activists and groups backed by the Koch brothers protested strongly against 
Cap and Trade after it was passed in the House.240 Right-wing media was portraying Cap and 
Trade as a tax bill that would increase costs for American consumers and make them take 
products they did not want. Many on conservative media implied Cap and Trade was part of a 
government plot to control every aspect of people's lives.241 Sen. McCain, who had been a strong 
supporter of climate change legislation, withdrew his support because he was being criticized for 
it by a right-wing radio host who was planning to challenge him in his 2010 primary election.242 
Most of the national green groups supporting the bill were hamstrung from applying 
electoral pressure because they were not grassroots-based and could not effectively mobilize 
voters to pressure lawmakers on their votes. The 1Sky alliance did have strong grassroots 
capacities, but was not included in negotiations over the bills.243 
Offer concessions or alternative benefits to overcome the resistance of influential 
organized groups bearing the near-term costs of the policy. 
Opposition to Cap and Trade by the majority of large businesses and business 
associations was fierce. In 2009, when it was under consideration in the House, 1,150 firms and 
organizations lobbied on it. Business lobbying was overwhelmingly against the bill, both in terms 
of lobbyists on Capitol Hill and expenditures.244 Waxman defused some of this opposition by 
allowing an average of 76% of emission allowances to be parceled out for free during the first 
eight years of the program, based on firms’ emission histories. Waxman even negotiated 
allocation of pollution permits with individual companies.245 Since this concession had an 
estimated annual value of $100-300 billion, it was enough to maintain the support of the industrial 
members of the USCAP alliance.246 Finally, concessions had to be made to the coal industry to 
maintain the support of Democratic members of Congress from coal states. These included a 
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delay in enforcing tougher standards on existing coal plants, $181 billion worth of bonus 
allowances for plants capturing carbon, $10 billion for carbon sequestration research and 
development, and a ban on the EPA regulating carbon emissions from existing plants.247 
Once Cap and Trade moved to the Senate, Sen. Kerry offered T. Boone Pickens, a high-
profile natural gas developer, tax incentives for natural gas fueling stations to gain his support. 
Kerry, Lieberman and Graham offered major oil companies representing their industry a deal to 
stabilize the cost of their emission permits in return for an agreement not to lobby against the 
bill.248  
Gather enough bipartisan political support to prevent the policy from being overturned at 
the next change of government. 
The Cap and Trade effort took place against a background of declining bipartisan support 
for environmental issues. Democratic votes in Congress for environmental measures increased 
from 56% in the 1970s to 86% in the 2000s while Republican support declined from 27% to 10%. 
This trend was evident when only eight Republicans voted for Cap and Trade in the House. After 
the vote, the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee issued press releases and 
advertisements targeting Democrats in swing districts who voted for it, framing the bill as a tax.249 
Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham took up the role of political entrepreneurs with 
gusto. Sen. Lieberman and his staff met with 40 senators in the first half of 2009 to find out what 
they would need to support climate legislation. He coaxed nine Republicans to work on legislation 
supporting the nuclear industry that would be merged with a climate bill. Senators Kerry and 
Graham jointly wrote an op-ed for the New York Times arguing for a climate bill that also 
expanded oil drilling and provided help for the nuclear industry. 250 
Sen. Graham was anxious about his participation, though. He warned Senators Kerry 
and Lieberman they needed to push the bill through as fast as possible because he was already 
                                                   
247 Brewer. 
248 Lizza. 




receiving criticism in his state for cooperating with them. If it lingered too long, he was fearful Fox 
News would pick up on the "cap and tax" theme. He was stung when the Obama administration 
undercut his ability to attract more Republicans by unilaterally opening new areas on the 
continental shelf for drilling and by proposing loan guarantees for the nuclear industry in the 
budget. Eventually, he quit the effort, seriously impairing the effort for a bipartisan compromise.251  
Senators Kerry and Lieberman tried to carry on, having conversations with Republican 
senators. Then, in what might be called a defocusing event, a massive oil spill from an explosion 
on the BP Deepwater Horizon drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico, seriously jeopardized the 
chance of enacting a bill that called for additional drilling on the continental shelf. Majority Leader 
Reid announced he was putting climate change on the back burner to focus on immigration 
reform and the effort for Cap and Trade was effectively over.252 
Conclusion 
How did the propositions fare when tested against the successful enactment of CAA70 
and unsuccessful effort for Cap and Trade? It appears that the importance of problem broker 
success in mobilizing public pressure for forward-looking policies was confirmed. In both cases, 
problem brokers were able to convince large majorities of the population there was a significant 
problem that the government should act on. However, in the CAA70 case the public responded 
by rating pollution as the second most important problem for the nation while in the Cap and 
Trade case, the surveyed public never rated climate change higher than tenth out of eleven major 
issues. This translated into a significant difference in mobilization so that even coal-state 
members of Congress voted for CAA70 while influence of the coal lobby was a key obstacle for 
Cap and Trade. On the other hand, information uncovered about efforts of problem brokers to 
educate policy communities and policymakers directly was too limited to draw any conclusions 
about its importance. 





There were some expected and some surprising results for the propositions relating to 
policy entrepreneurs. Both cases did fulfill the criterion of having a credible regulatory structure to 
deliver long-term benefits despite the uncertainty of future conditions. Assuming the proposals 
were implemented as written, they would provide certain reductions in the targeted emissions. 
The CAA70 was set to deliver broad near-term benefits within a short period in the form of 
cleaner air. Its implicit promise to deliver the results in less than a decade may have been 
unrealistic, but it was attractive. The Cap and Trade effort promised only meager and narrowly 
focused near-term benefits. Without a groundswell of public pressure, as proceeded the CAA70 
enactment, that may have been an opportunity missed. The surprising result was that the CAA70 
passed in spite of serious questions about its technical feasibility and value acceptability. Those 
concerns seemed to be swept away by the enthusiasm to enact a citizens’ right to clean air 
regardless. On the other hand, the finding that Cap and Trade had good evidence for value 
acceptability and technical feasibility could not save it. 
The findings concerning political entrepreneurs did seem to conform to the propositions 
that were advanced. The judgment that the time was ripe for CAA70 to clean up air pollution was 
supported by scientific research, public opinion on both the reality of the problem and its 
importance, and the obvious mobilization of the public and advocacy organizations. It was even 
obvious to representatives of the coal industry who regarded legislation as inevitable.  
It was a different story with Cap and Trade. Problem brokers were able to convince most 
of the public that the problem was real, but not that it was more important than a host of other 
issues. With the messages going out to the Republican base about the uncertainty of global 
warming and the government overreach of Cap and Trade, Republican lawmakers could oppose 
it with no electoral penalty, while supporting it could lose them a primary election. 
The importance of party leadership for forward-looking issues was supported in these 
cases in regards to the role of presidents in the American system. Pres. Nixon took a very active 
role in CAA70, even sending draft legislation to Congress, and the effort succeeded. Republicans 
were eager to join Democrats in supporting CAA70. Pres. Obama was supportive of Cap and 
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Trade, but let others lead on it and the effort fizzled. When Pres. Obama was proactive in setting 
a direction for Dodd-Frank, financial reform succeeded.  
The leaders of Congress have a great deal of power in deciding the substance and pace 
of legislation, which Speaker Pelosi exercised by speeding consideration of Cap and Trade in the 
House, and Majority Leader Reid by slowing it down, then finally killing the bill in the Senate. In 
the CAA70 case, there was no indication they acted in either way. It appears active involvement 
of presidents and their staffs are an important ingredient in enacting major forward-looking 
policies in the U.S. while the influence congressional party leaders is secondary. 
In terms of building majorities for enactment, it appeared that political entrepreneurs have 
marginal ways to reassure members about electoral security. In the case of CAA70, there was no 
need for reassurance and, in the case of Cap and Trade, there was nothing political 
entrepreneurs could do for Republican senators in the face of grassroots Republican skepticism 
and concerted Tea Party and business campaigns against the bill.  
Similarly, political entrepreneurs have limited room to maneuver in making concessions 
or offering alternative benefits to neutralize the opposition of influential groups. In CAA70, public 
sentiment was so strong that there was little need to placate opposition groups. In Cap and 
Trade, Rep. Waxman, and Senators Kerry and Lieberman gave so many concessions to groups 
allied with the Republican Party that they lost the support of the largest grassroots environmental 
alliance. It may be that these represent two extremes. Dodd-Frank appears to fall between these 
extremes. It had strong public support, but the political entrepreneurs still had to make 
concessions to locally influential elites to hold their majorities. Perhaps deals to neutralize the 
opposition of organized groups can complement strong public support, but not substitute for it. 
As mentioned above, CAA70 and Cap and Trade may represent extremes, and that was 
certainly the case in building bipartisan political support. With CAA70, the political entrepreneurs 
had to do next to nothing to achieve overwhelming bipartisan support. With Cap and Trade, it 
seemed that, despite great efforts, nothing worked. The durability of the Clean Air Act over 50 
years shows the value of a strong bipartisan base, but, in many cases, creating bipartisan 
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majorities may not be feasible for political entrepreneurs. The chance for bipartisan enactment 
may belong more in the hands of policy entrepreneurs who can design policies that are framed to 
fit in the (often) small window where party interests overlap. This is the theory of the Bipartisan 
Policy Center in developing policies that are comfortable for both parties, even if it means they 
can only be incremental steps towards a larger goal in the absence of a major focusing event. 
Several opportunities to find that overlap with Cap and Trade may have been overlooked when 
Senators Kerry, Graham and Lieberman, failed to follow up on Chief of Staff Emanuel’s 
suggestion about settling for a mandate on utilities to buy renewable power, or when Senators 
Cantwell and Collins recommended a “Cap and Dividend” plan that a sizeable majority of 
Americans supported. 
In summary, if these cases are typical–an open question–they paint a picture in which 
public mobilization by focusing events and problem brokers drives the large and lasting bipartisan 
changes in forward-looking policy made by Congress. Bipartisan support is critical to insure that 
forward-looking policies will last long enough to be effective but is hard to achieve in the absence 
of the electoral threat from public pressure.  
Public opinion requires intensity as well as broad agreement to be effective. The support 
of party leadership, especially at the presidential level, can be a strong influencer in moving 
legislation. Party leadership in Congress can speed up, slow down, or effectively kill legislation, 
so it is important, but secondary to other factors. 
Returning to the lessons of the BPC case, in the absence of strong public pressure, 
progress can still be made on forward-looking policymaking, but only at an incremental pace. This 
requires the careful work of policy entrepreneurs to find steps that can be taken towards long-
term goals, which also fall in the sometimes narrow region of acceptability to both political parties. 
The incremental option was available, but not taken in the Cap and Trade case. In choosing 
between a comprehensive strategy and an incremental strategy, it may be that political 
entrepreneurs are best served by knowing when public sentiment is so strong that credible 
threats to opponents’ re-election can be made and when they cannot. 
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Chapter 5 One Investigation Ends, Others Begin 
This investigation began with the question of why democratic governments find it so 
difficult to implement forward-looking policies that address long-term and emerging problems. 
While that is a worthwhile question for anyone who cares about democratic governance and the 
welfare of future generations, it is also a question that is too broad to answer in one study. To 
create a feasible project, the last four chapters have explored the narrower sub-question of what 
are the necessary conditions to enact forward-looking policies in the United States Congress? 
The theoretical work around the multiple streams framework and the four case studies in the 
previous chapters have gone a short way towards suggesting answers to that question. 
In Chapter 2, Kingdon’s multiple streams framework showed its capacity to grow and 
improve with the work of multiple scholars. While its basic structure of three streams of 
information on policies, problems, and politics was retained, a number of additional actors and 
information sources were identified. Rather than a single role of the policy entrepreneur coupling 
the three streams during windows of opportunity, scholars working on the MSF have 
differentiated roles of problem brokers, policy entrepreneurs, and political entrepreneurs to create 
greater intellectual clarity.253 In most cases, this seems to reflect the way the world works. Those 
framing social conditions as problems are often not the same people as those who are exploring 
policy solutions. Neither the problem brokers nor the policy entrepreneurs are typically the people 
who are working inside legislative institutions assembling majorities for passage of bills. 
The new source of policy ideas, international policy transfer, was added and two 
additional modifications were made based on work by Grossman.254 The first is a recognition that 
there are semi-stable governing networks of legislators who have long relationships and 
adequate levels of trust to work together on legislation. It is these governing networks that 
political entrepreneurs engage to enact bills. The second modification is a recognition that a 
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legislative agenda is not predictive of what is actually enacted by Congress. So, the concept of an 
agenda can be eliminated with no loss of explanatory power. 
One modification suggested by the case studies was that the influence of partisan 
interests on the political stream could be more clearly conveyed by labeling party leaders as the 
relevant actors. In these legislative case studies, it was often presidents and congressional 
leaders that provided essential support for political entrepreneurs–or blocked them. Presidents 
Nixon and Obama played very active roles in the passage of CAA70 and Dodd-Frank. Pres. 
Obama and Sen. Reid’s passivity on Cap and Trade seemed to doom its chances in the Senate. 
Committee leaders in these cases did the hard work of political entrepreneurs, but party leaders 
often decided how to frame proposals, which should be heavily supported with the levers of 
power, which should only receive rhetorical support, which should be fast-tracked, and which 
should be slowed or killed. 
 A final modification was a recognition from the literature of forward-looking governance 
that foresight efforts should be recognized as a separate source of information that enters the 
problem stream.255 Current concerns about climate change are an example of policy being driven 
by foresight efforts such as reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.256 
Like every model, this framework simplifies a messy reality, leaving out variables others 
might include. Taking to heart George E. P. Box’s comment that “All models are wrong; some are 
useful,”257 the chapter then tested the modified framework for its usefulness by applying it to a 
case study about the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (P.L. 111-203). The modified framework was found to be a useful way of understanding this 
legislative history. Actors and actions were easy to identify with the concepts of the framework. 
The arrows of influence pointed in the expected directions.  
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The 2008 financial crisis provided a critical focusing event that problem brokers, such as 
Elizabeth Warren, Barak Obama, and Americans for Financial Reform, were successful in 
framing as the result of reckless behavior by financial institutions and a system rigged against 
consumers. Once in office, Barak Obama’s communications about the financial crisis displayed 
the role of presidents as problem brokers.  His communications highlighted the importance of the 
problem and the need for action. 
Obama played the important role of a party leader not only in giving rhetorical support to 
the Dodd-Frank effort, but by holding in-person meetings to help organize the effort and 
empowering his Secretary of the Treasury to take the lead in writing the legislation. 
Congressional party leaders played a secondary role, mainly staying out of the way of their 
committee chairs, but helping to smooth disputes between committees and intervening when 
caucus members had concerns.  
The national mood, as reflected in opinion polls and most newspapers, displayed anger 
at “Wall Street” and support for financial reform. This opened a window for the development and 
enactment of new policies. Given the national mood, Elizabeth Warren was able to transition from 
a problem broker to a policy entrepreneur role, demonstrating that individuals can play multiple 
roles. 
Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner played the critical role of a policy 
entrepreneur by overseeing the work of presidential appointees, civil servants, and outside 
experts in writing the legislation, then educating congressional staff and members about the 
proposal. He was enabled in this delegated role by Pres. Obama’s support. 
Representative Barney Frank (D-Ma) and Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) filled the role of 
political entrepreneurs by working with governing networks in the House and Senate to obtain 
passage. They persuaded members about the value of the bill and approved the concessions 
necessary to reassure members that passage would not threaten their re-election. Based on a 
detailed description of the numerous meeting, concessions, and design decisions they made, it is 
difficult to imagine anyone outside of Congress playing the role of a political entrepreneur there. 
89 
 
In sum, the MSF provided convenient ways to think about roles of the different actors, 
even when the same actor transitioned between multiple roles. On the other hand, it was not 
predictive of the outcome, which was never certain until the end because success depended on 
the vote of one skittish Republican Senator. Being able to classify actors in a complex historical 
drama is not the same as understanding the dynamics of the situation. However, having a robust 
classification system is a first step towards developing theory, which was the goal of chapters 3 
and 4. 
Chapter 3 began the process of developing a theory of forward-looking policy enactment 
through a case study of lobbying by the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC). This organization has 
been simultaneously advocating for legislation that would increase spending on infrastructure 
through public-private partnerships, and for increased federal support for energy research to 
change the future mix of U.S. energy sources. The question was how their lobbying and 
education strategies changed when dealing with the current, well-understood issue of inadequate 
infrastructure spending compared to their strategies when advocating a forward-looking policy of 
changing our energy mix.  
A comparison of their lobbying strategies showed that advocating for forward-looking 
policies to address future conditions required BPC to engage in more complex messaging 
advocating on the current issue of infrastructure funding. Their forward-looking efforts on energy 
included research, long-form reports, seminars, and workshops to educate policymakers and their 
staffs about the nature of the problem. They presented extensive evidence and logical arguments 
about how new energy policies would provide long-term social benefits by commercializing new 
technologies, moderating climate change, and improving energy security. In effect, they were 
acting as a problem broker as well as a policy entrepreneur. 
As an advocate on infrastructure, BPC could assume that the benefits of improved 
infrastructure funding was a shared goal and well understood by their audience. With this 
background, they could focus exclusively on policy solutions. On infrastructure, they were able to 
readily mobilize top-tier business associations and influential businesspeople across the country 
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to lobby Congress. They judged that a window of opportunity was open for a major expansion of 
infrastructure funding, driven by a bipartisan consensus on the need, so they helped orchestrate 
a lobbying campaign for legislation that would enable significant public-private partnerships.   
On future energy issues, BPC was not able to create a politically powerful coalition. In the 
absence of a powerful coalition, they built a portfolio of credible, incremental energy policies their 
lobbyists could bring up when political conditions were favorable. With this focus, they were only 
able to create a coalition of insurgent business firms, universities, and nonprofits–none of the 
major business associates joined. 
It is interesting that BPC had some success in convincing members of Congress with its 
incremental policy to increase energy research funding in the face of the Trump Administration’s 
plan to cut it significantly. This contrasts with the case of infrastructure funding where virtually no 
progress was made despite the assumption that a bipartisan policy window had opened. The 
failure of the infrastructure funding initiative was not analyzed as part of the case, but it is 
interesting to note that the Trump Administration position reflects many of the policy ideas of 
BPC.258 On infrastructure funding, the administration never marshaled the effort to draft 
legislation, let congressional leaders know that moving infrastructure funding legislation was a top 
priority, and delegate a top administration official to act as a policy entrepreneur who would 
educate members of Congress, as Pres. Obama did for Dodd-Frank.  
Chapter 4 combines insights from the Dodd-Frank and BPC cases with arguments from 
the literature of forward-looking policymaking, and the modified multiple streams framework to 
develop propositions about the necessary conditions to enact forward-looking policy in Congress. 
The propositions were then examined in the context of the successful enactment of the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1970 (CAA70; 91-604) and the failure to enact legislation in 2009-2010 
                                                   





period to cap greenhouse gas emissions and reduce them while offering companies the 
opportunity to trade emission allowances (Cap and Trade).  
The term propositions was used in this investigation because they were something more 
than speculations, having been based on literature, but not developed enough to be hypotheses 
subject to empirical testing. Each proposition states a condition that makes it more likely a 
forward-looking proposal will be enacted in the U.S. Congress. Confidence in some of the 
propositions increased through a study of the cases while some decreased. As the findings are 
discussed fully in Chapter 4, they are listed here with only summary conclusions. The 
propositions explored in Chapter 4 all concern enactment of forward-looking laws in the U.S. 
Congress. It was claimed that enactment will be more likely if 
Problem Brokers 
Mobilize public pressure by framing expected social conditions as public problems that 
will cause specific harms if nothing is done, using narratives emphasizing focusing events 
that evoke emotions, values and hope as well as reason.  
This proposition was strongly supported in the cases. In the successful enactment, public 
pressure was broad enough, and intense enough to cause the parties to join a bidding war to 
satisfy the demand for action. In the failing case, public pressure was never strong enough to 
threaten the re-election of the bill’s opponents. 
Educate policy communities and policymakers at a higher level than for well-understood 
short-term problems. 
It was difficult to draw a general conclusion on this proposition. There were a few 
examples of problem-oriented education efforts targeted at policymakers in the cases.  
• Senator Edmund Muskie used committee hearings to educate colleagues about 
environmental pollution,  
• Environmentalist Paul Ehrlich met with Senator Gaylord Nelson and inspired him 
to become an activist,  
• Elizabeth Warren spoke about her research on financial industry abuses to 
audiences of policymakers, and 
• Former Vice President Al Gore met with Senator Barak Obama during the 2008 
presidential campaign to discuss climate change and renewable power, and BPC 
had many events to educate policymakers about the problems and opportunities 
of America’s energy mix.  
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These are very few and data about the impact of these encounters is meager. This may be 
because it seldom happens, seldom has great impact, encounters between problem brokers and 
policy makers are seldom documented. The example of BPC’s educational efforts was only 
available because of the extensive documentation on its website. Only further research could 
determine which of these alternatives is more probable. 
Policy Entrepreneurs 
Develop proposals that meet the normal policy criteria of technical feasibility, value 
acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints. 
It appeared from the environmental cases that this proposition was irrelevant. Because 
public pressure for CAA70 was high enough, policymakers were willing to bet on a policy that 
expressed values the public demanded, whether or not it met normal feasibility criteria. 
Alternatively, when there was not enough public pressure to enact Cap and Trade, studies 
indicating technical feasibility were not enough to save it.  
Enacting policies without strong evidence of technical feasibility may not seem like the 
best way to enact good policy. However, the opportunities to enact forward-looking policies in 
Congress may be so rare that a rational strategy might be called enact it first when a window 
opens for a bipartisan agreement, and fix it later. This has actually played out with the Clean Air 
Act, which has been amended several times with bipartisan support. 
Provide rationales about how the recommended policies will minimize future harms, 
including mechanisms to assure the delivery of long-term benefits despite uncertain 
future social and political conditions. 
Both bills detailed regulatory systems with hard targets, so there were rationales about 
how they would deliver their long-term benefits. Since these were features of both bills, it is not 
possible to draw a conclusion about the importance of the proposition. The literature strongly 
supports this as a necessary condition. 
Include broad near-term benefits, if possible. 
The CAA70 promised cleaner air for the nation in a short (if unrealistic) timeframe, which 
was a significant and broad near-term benefit. Cap and Trade offered no broad near-term 
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benefits. It offered over a dozen programs to compensate groups that might be hurt by its side 
effects, but these were very narrow in their application. These contrasting conditions provide a 
moderate amount of support for the proposition. 
Political Entrepreneurs 
Evaluate whether political conditions are favorable for enactment of a comprehensive 
policy, an incremental policy, or not favorable for any policy enactment. 
This proposition is an elaboration of Kingdon’s conviction that policy enactments happens 
when a policy windows opens. The proposition in this study adds the concept of levels of 
“openness.”  As an example, the conditions in 2009 might not have been ripe for Cap and Trade 
to overturn the American energy system, as surely was intended, but they may have been ripe for 
BPC’s incremental policy of increasing federal support for energy research.  
Judging the favorability of political conditions does appear to be a critical function of 
political entrepreneurs. In the CAA70 case, both Nixon and Muskie surveyed conditions and 
made political judgments that the time was ripe to move on air pollution with a major initiative. In 
Cap and Trade, it appears that Waxman and Pelosi misjudged what could be accomplished by 
not thinking through how fragile Republican base support was.  
Gain and maintain the support of party leaders. 
What came through in the cases was the importance in the U.S. of the president as the 
party leader who matters most in marshaling resources for a forward-looking effort. With current 
issues, powerful interests groups and congressional allies can spark legislative efforts and 
maintain elite pressure on lawmakers to cobble together a bill. When difficult legacy or emerging 
issues are considered, it appeared that only presidents can use rhetorical tools to rally public 
support, provide cover for their partisans if there are costs to be paid, and provide Congress with 
the material support from the executive branch to launch the effort. Once a president has set a 
direction and provided material support, party leaders in Congress can exercise their institutional 
power to enable or block enactment. 
Reassure members of the governing network about electoral security. 
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The environmental cases did not offer insight on this issue. In the case of CAA70, no 
reassurance was necessary because of the overwhelming public pressure in favor of a bill. In the 
Cap and Trade case, there was little security that political entrepreneurs could offer to 
Republicans facing Tea Party pressure. In the Dodd-Frank case, the sponsors did succeed in 
maintaining their majority by making concessions to locally important constituencies of anxious 
members. 
Offer concessions or alternative benefits to overcome the resistance of influential 
organized groups bearing the near-term costs of the policy. 
This is often an important responsibility of the political entrepreneur, but its effectiveness 
seems contingent on the national mood and the partisan balance. In the Dodd-Frank case, a 
series of strategic concessions allowed the sponsors to eke out a victory. In the CAA70 case, few 
concessions were necessary due to the public pressure on Congress. In Cap and Trade a large 
number of concessions to industrial interests were enough to enact the bill in the House, but the 
strategy of concessions and offering alternative benefits fell short of building the needed 60 vote 
majority in the Senate. A danger of this strategy was apparent in the Cap and Trade case–the 
sponsors made so many concessions to industry that they lost significant support among 
environmental constituencies. 
Gather enough bipartisan political support to prevent the policy from being overturned at 
the next change of government. 
The durability of CAA70 over 50 years supports the importance of gaining bipartisan 
support. In contrast, Dodd-Frank, passed with next to no Republican support and was weakened 
under the Trump Administration just eight years after it was passed.259  
The lesson of Cap and Trade, however, is that the potential for bipartisan support may be 
extremely difficult for political entrepreneurs to find after a bill has been introduced. The work of 
problem brokers in building public pressure seems critical for enacting major forward-looking 
policy in the U.S. system. Unless there is overwhelming and intense public support, as there was 
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for CAA70, the opportunity for bipartisan enactment rests in the hands of policy entrepreneurs like 
BPC to design incremental policies that fit in the often small convergence of interests of the 
political parties. 
While conclusions based on qualitative case studies must be tentative, four important 
implications flow from this investigation. The first is on the importance of problem brokers. If they 
are able to frame expected future conditions as serious and urgent public problems and create 
narratives that arouse the public’s values and emotions, they will have a chance to mobilize 
public pressure on Congress and the President to generate legislative action. How they mobilize 
the public is outside the scope of this investigation, but the effects were clear on CAA70, and their 
lack was clear on Cap and Trade. Gore commented to friends about his feeling that his advocacy 
work had failed to create enough intensity of feeling.260 
If public mobilization is high and bipartisan support is available, the technical aspects of a 
policy may not be critical. Public mobilization can evaporate, so it is critical for problem brokers, 
policy entrepreneurs, and political entrepreneurs to seize the moment and enact a law. If both 
political parties are committed to a bipartisan law, it can be re-opened and corrections can be 
made later. Providing broad near-term benefits as part of a policy package can help maintain 
public mobilization. 
Another implication is how critical the work of evaluating political conditions is for policy 
entrepreneurs who care about the survival of their proposals after enactment. There are often 
dozens of ways that government policies can address an expected problem with a long-term 
solution. Only a few of these policy designs (in some cases none) can both be effective in 
addressing the problem and gain bipartisan support. When one party controls both chambers of 
Congress, and the presidency, major initiatives can sometimes be passed along exclusively or 
nearly exclusive partisan lines, as was the case with Dodd-Frank, but their longevity will be in 
doubt. Unless there are policy mechanisms that can lock in future Congresses, it appears better 




to take a smaller, incremental approach as BPC did with its energy initiative and then prepare for 
the next opportunity. 
Finally, for major forward-looking initiatives in the American system, a key factor is the 
commitment of presidents. To be effective, their commitment must go beyond rhetorical support 
and lead to tangible support in the form of advocacy by a top appointed official, drafting help, and 
lobbying assistance. Tight coordination between the administration and the political entrepreneurs 
in Congress is also critical as was shown by a positive experience with Dodd-Frank and missteps 
with Cap and Trade. 
Beyond providing confirmation for the most promising propositions through future 
research, this study could be extended to issues that were outside its scope. For instance, the 
investigation led to a strong conclusion that the ability of problem brokers to arouse public 
mobilization plays a formative role in the passage of major forward-looking policies by Congress. 
However, there is strong evidence that public opinion is largely irrelevant to the bills Congress 
passes,261 so mobilization would have to be defined and differentiated from public opinion in a 
future study. If the role of mobilization in enacting major forward-looking policy was confirmed, it 
would naturally lead to questions about how mobilization happens and the role of problem 
brokers in creating it.  
For issues on which large scale public mobilization is unlikely, the conclusions of this 
study naturally lead to questions about how policy entrepreneurs can find an overlap of partisan 
positions that provide windows for incremental forward-looking policy enactments. These 
compatibilities may be where parties happen to embrace the same values, such as making sure 
that Social Security benefits are protected for seniors. Often, though, policy entrepreneurs must 
exercise creative judgment about where one policy can be justified under different partisan 
rationales, for instance bipartisan support for employee stock ownership programs are justified 
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because, “Republicans believe they promote the ownership society and Democrats believe they 
spread the wealth.”262 Ways to find these compatibilities deserves research. 
There is no end to interesting questions in any field, but this may be especially true in 
democratic policymaking where all interests, all sorts of people, and all idealisms meet in the 
messy process of lawmaking. This investigation has come a ways, but, before trusting any of the 
propositions, they will need to be operationalized as formal hypotheses and put to the test against 
a history of many enactments. To understand their scope, international comparisons would be 
helpful. This will have to be done while keeping a lookout for factors that were assumed away in 
this study, for instance the influence of campaign contributions and institutional rules. And so, one 
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